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ABSTRACT 
 
Claudia Carolyn Kubowicz Malhotra: The Impact of Desirability and Feasibility 
Considerations for Self and Others 
(Under the direction of Rebecca K. Ratner) 
 
 
Construal Level Theory (CLT) proposes that social distance will operate similarly to 
temporal distance in that individuals’ perceptions of others will be high level, abstract 
construals, and individuals’ own perceptions will be low level, concrete construals (at least 
for the near future; Liberman, Trope, and Stephan in press, Trope and Liberman 2003).  
Consequently individuals will predict that desirability considerations are more important to 
others than to self, and will indicate that feasibility considerations are more important to self 
than to others.  Four studies show this effect by examining the prediction of others’ 
preferences, and the choices people make on behalf of others.  These studies replicate the 
effect using different manipulations of desirability considerations (i.e., importance of brands 
in general, a specific brand of a consumer product, and attributes of a consumer product and 
experience) as well as feasibility considerations (i.e., importance of value in general, the 
price of a consumer product, and attributes of a consumer product and experience).  
Therefore, the effect is not driven solely by individuals’ perceptions that they are more price 
sensitive than others, but rather results from perceived differences between self and others in 
the importance of the tradeoff between desirability and feasibility considerations.  Results 
also indicate that closeness of the relationship to the other to the self is a moderator of the 
effect such that the effect is attenuated as the relationship to the other becomes closer to the 
 iv 
 
self (i.e., average other vs. friend). Because individuals perceive that others value desirability 
considerations, results show that they report different preferences (i.e., preferences favoring 
desirability considerations) for themselves in public than they do in private.   Consequently, 
the self-other difference not only influences the choices individuals make for others, but also 
the choices they make for themselves in different social settings.  Two final studies examine 
representation of the other (i.e., level of concrete representation) as the underlying 
mechanism for the self-other effect.  No conclusive evidence is found that a concrete 
representation attenuates the self-other effect. Future directions and managerial implications 
are discussed. 
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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION 
 
People make consumption choices not only for themselves, but also for others.   For 
example, people purchase items to give as gifts to family and friends.  When grocery 
shopping, people make decisions for the other members of their household. Individuals may 
make living arrangements for elderly relatives.  In work environments, people make all kind 
of decisions for others by choosing everything from the copier paper to the restaurant 
catering lunch. The focus of certain jobs, such a client services in industries as diverse as 
brokerages to wedding coordinators, is making decisions on behalf of customers.  In all of 
these situations, people must make consumptions decisions for others. 
 This dissertation will examine the choices individuals make for others as well as for 
themselves.  Specifically of interest are decisions where individuals have to trade off 
desirability and feasibility considerations (i.e., they can not have both) .1  For example, a 
person considering buying a sweater as a gift for a friend may be attracted to a high-end 
designer label because a prestigious brand is a desirable attribute.  However, because it is a 
high-end product, the sweater may only be cleaned at the dry cleaner.  Dry cleaning is 
expensive and logistically difficult, which are both important feasibility attributes.  Compare 
this sweater to one that does not have the high-end designer label, but is machine washable.  
Which sweater does the person buy for his friend?  If the person were buying the sweater for 
                                                 
1 The focus of the current research is on the tradeoffs people will make when the choice set 
includes options that are either highly desirable (not highly feasible) or highly feasible (not 
highly desirable). An option that is both highly desirable and highly feasible would be 
considered to be a dominating option. 
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himself, would his choice be different?  This dissertation studies how people make these 
tradeoffs between desirability and feasibility considerations by examining the prediction of 
others’ preferences, the choices people make for others, and one’s own choices in different 
social settings.  Moreover, this dissertation attempts to identify the level of representation as 
the underlying mechanism of this self-other effect.  Specifically, as the representation of the 
other person becomes more concrete, it is predicted that people will be less likely to predict 
that others would prefer the highly desirable alternative.  The studies also use different 
manipulations of desirability considerations (i.e., importance of brands in general, a specific 
brand of a consumer product, and attributes of a consumer product and experience) as well as 
feasibility considerations (i.e., importance of value in general, the price of a consumer 
product, and attributes of a consumer product and experience) to show that the effect is not 
driven solely by individuals’ perceptions that they are more price sensitive than others, but 
rather are due to perceived differences between self and others in the importance of the 
tradeoff between desirability and feasibility considerations. 
 
Construal Level Theory (CLT) 
 
Prior research has examined how individuals tradeoff desirability and feasibility 
considerations primarily in the context of time.  Specifically, Construal Level Theory (CLT) 
has found that people are poor predictors of the own behavior because future events are 
construed differently than present ones.  CLT presents evidence that people have more 
abstract, desirability-focused construals for distant future decisions and more concrete, 
feasibility-focused construals for near future decisions (Trope and Liberman 2000, 2003).  
Trope and Liberman (2003) define desirability as “the value of an action’s end state” and 
feasibility as “the ease or difficulty of reaching the end state.” These definitions are 
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supported by prior research which has defined desirability to be the superordinate “why” 
aspects of an action and feasibility to be the subordinate “how” aspects of an action (Carver 
and Scheier 1981, 1990, 1999; Vallacher and Wegner 1987). For example, in one of their 
studies, Liberman and Trope (1998) presented students with an actual choice in assignments 
in a social psychology class. Students were given two options. One was a highly feasible 
assignment because the necessary readings were in their native language, but the topic of the 
history of social psychology was not very interesting which made it less desirable.  The other 
assignment was difficult and thus less feasible because the readings were in a foreign 
language, but the topic of love was interesting which made it highly desirable.  Students 
indicated that they would prefer the easy assignment, if they had to do the assignment in the 
near future.  However, students were much more likely to choose the difficult, but interesting 
assignment for the distant future.  In other words, feasibility considerations were more 
important in the near future whereas desirability considerations were more important in the 
distant future.   
The CLT proposes that social distance (self vs. other) will operate similarly to 
temporal distance (Liberman, Trope, and Stephan in press, Trope and Liberman 2003). In 
other words, social distance (self vs. other) may also cause a shift in construal level with the 
self being more concrete and focused on feasible objects and perceptions of others being 
more abstract and focused on highly desirable objects.   Therefore, social distance may be a 
reason why people are not successful in making predictions and assessing the preferences of 
others. 
Although proposed by Trope and Liberman (2003), there has been limited research on 
social distance as a mechanism of shifting levels of construal.  One exception is work by 
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Chandran and Menon (2004), which in one study looked at the interactive effect of social and 
temporal distance in a health risk context.  Specifically, the dependent variables were 
perceived health risk for self and others, and the objective of their research was to determine 
whether framing health hazards as occurring every day versus every year would make risks 
more concrete and proximal which would then result in higher self-risk perceptions.  For 
example, would a day frame increase the perceived self risk of dying from tobacco smoke 
when an ad states that 1,206 people (versus 440,000 a year) succumb each day to its deadly 
effects (Chandran and Menon 2004)?  Indeed, when a health risk, such as the contraction of 
Mono, was given in a daily statistic (i.e., proximal and concrete time frame) people indicated 
that they were at a higher risk of contracting Mono than when the risk was communicated in 
a yearly statistic. Additionally, the study asked participants to indicate not only their own risk 
perceptions, but also that of a best friend (i.e., close other) and the average undergraduate 
student (i.e., distant other) in order to test whether temporal framing will moderate the self-
positivity bias.  No differences were found between the three (e.g., self, best friend, average 
undergraduate student) in the day time frame.  Everyone perceived to be at a high risk for 
contracting Mono.  However, in the year time frame (i.e., distant and abstract time frame), 
people indicated that they and their best friend were less at risk to contract Mono than the 
average undergraduate student. The day frame is more effective for the self and close others 
because the frame is concrete and self and close others are represented more concretely than 
others. Moreover, people perceive others to be at high risk even in the year frame. The daily 
frame does not change their already high perceptions of others’ risk.  On the other hand, the 
year frame is abstract, and although in this frame people are able to predict high risk for 
distant others, they are not able to accurately predict their own risk as well as that of close 
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others (because there is a mismatch in representation between target and frame). The 
theoretical implication of this work is that concrete representations attenuate the difference 
between perceptions of self and others; however, this result was found for perceived health 
risk not for the perceived willingness to make tradeoffs between desirability and feasibility 
considerations.  
Another exception is work by Ebert (2005) who also examined the interactive effect 
of social and temporal distance in a dilemma context where people had to incur short-term 
costs to obtain long-term benefits.  Study participants indicated how they and others (i.e., a 
friend) would make these types of tradeoffs, such as quitting to smoke for health reasons, but 
knowing it would be difficult to quit and wanting to get into shape, but knowing it would be 
challenging to exercise everyday.  Results indicated that people did not perceive any 
difference in the importance of the benefit (i.e., quitting smoking, getting into shape, etc.) to 
self and others.  However, the importance of the cost (i.e., not being able to pick up a 
cigarette, going to the gym, etc.) was perceived to be more important to the self than others.  
Additionally, the relative importance of the long-term benefit versus the short-term cost was 
perceived to be more important to others than self.  As a result, this research argues that 
people perceive others to more forward-looking and self-controlled than they are themselves.  
The dependent variables in the research were the importance of the benefits and costs to self 
and others.  Even though this research examined how people make tradeoffs, it explicitly 
studied how people trade off current costs for future benefits (i.e., the temporal tradeoff), and 
how people perceive others make these tradeoffs.   
Ebert’s (2005) research work differs from the current work in a number of ways.  
First, her primary interest was to study how individuals trade off costs and benefits because 
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her primary research interest is the influence of delayed consequences on present behavior. 
Second, the focus of her work was the interactive relationship between the importance of 
costs and benefits now and in the future.  The studies reported here do not have a time 
component in that all scenarios are in the present.  Moreover, the focus of the current work is 
the impact of social distance on the self-other effect in the context of predicting others’ 
preferences, choosing for others, and choosing for one’s self in different social settings (i.e., 
private vs. public).  Lastly, the work of Ebert (2005) does include a measurement of different 
representations (i.e., abstract, concrete, and vivid), but representation was not manipulated or 
identified as a potential mediator of the self-other effect as it is the present research. 
  Even though recent research (Chandran and Menon 2004, Ebert 2005) has begun 
linking self-other research to the CLT, none has provided direct tests of the present 
hypotheses. According to CLT, both the distant future and distant others are represented 
abstractly.  Therefore, just as people are poor predictors of their own future preferences by 
focusing too much on desirability and not enough on feasibility considerations, people should 
be poor at predicting the preferences of others by focusing too much on desirability 
considerations and not enough on feasibility considerations. This dissertation seeks to 
provide evidence to support this prediction by studying the prediction of others’ preferences 
(including a test of the effect in a context where one presumes to already have the item in 
one’s possession, i.e., receiving a gift and making the decision to return it or not), the choices 
individuals make for others, and the choices individuals make for themselves.   Moreover, 
the level of representation of the other is studied in order to determine whether representation 
is the underlying mechanism of this self-other effect. 
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Prediction Errors 
 
How accurate are consumers in predicting the preferences of others?  An extensive 
literature on social prediction has found that people are not accurate when predicting the 
preferences of others.  Research has found that people’s lay theories exaggerate the 
importance of material pay-offs on others’ behavior by predicting that others will be more 
motivated by money than they are themselves (Miller and Ratner 1998).  It has also been 
found that people think others are generally more materialistic than they are themselves, and 
thus are more likely to be satisfied with a monetary compensation in cases of product and 
service failure than individuals would be themselves (Ratner and Kubowicz Malhotra 2006).  
Not only are people poor predictors of others’ responses, they are overly confident in their 
predictions (Dunning, Griffin, Milojkovic and Ross 1990).  Specifically, people are poor in 
predicting the activities, interest and opinions of others, and experts are not more accurate 
than others in making predictions (Hoch 1988).   Individuals cannot blame a lack of 
motivation for the poor predictions of others’ preferences because even individuals who were 
highly motivated have been found to make incorrect predictions (Kray 2000).   
 How do these prediction errors occur?  There are instances where the prediction 
errors occur because people rely too heavily on their own opinions in predicting the opinions 
of others.  One such example is that of experts who feel confident in their opinions and rely 
heavily on them to predict the preferences of others.  Misprediction occurs because experts 
are not similar to the target population for whom they make predictions (Hoch 1988).  
However, in other cases, the prediction error occurs because people do not rely enough on 
their own opinions in predicting the opinions of others.  Even spouses (i.e., people who know 
one another well) have been found to be poor predictors of each other’s preferences (Davis, 
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Hoch, and Ragsdale 1986).  Almost half of the predictions would have been more accurate if 
the predictor had just reported her own preference. Additionally, Hoch (1987) argues against 
false consensus or projection where people rely too heavily on their own attitudes and 
behaviors in making predictions about others and finds that people would be more accurate if 
they relied on their own positions even more. 
 How do people make predictions? Davis and colleagues (1986) argue that people use 
an anchor and adjustment model to make predictions about others.  The anchor is their own 
preferences, and they use available information about the other to adjust the prediction.   
They find that people adjust too much, and would be better off using their own preferences to 
predict the preferences of others.  Hsee and Weber (1997) test the anchor and adjustment 
model in the context of risk aversion and find that people are highly risk-adverse themselves. 
However, because people cannot be fully empathetic of others, they adjust their own feelings 
toward risk neutrality when making predictions about others.  As a result, people predict that 
others are less risk adverse than they are themselves.   The accuracy of the prediction is 
governed by the target.  When the target is concrete, the predictor’s own feelings are weighed 
more heavily and consequently the prediction is more accurate.  When the target is abstract, 
the predictor’s own feelings are weighed less heavily and results in inaccurate predictions.  
Thus, the prediction error only occurs when the target is abstract, not when it is vivid or 
concrete, because people do not adjust as much when the target is vivid and use their own 
preferences to drive their predictions of others’ preferences. 
  
The Effect of Social Distance 
 
 In the context of CLT, social distance is predicted to operate similarly to temporal 
distance in shifting construal levels (Liberman, Trope, and Stephan in press, Trope and 
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Liberman 2003). Specifically, it is predicted that people will perceive others using abstract, 
high level construals. Consequently, individuals will predict that desirability considerations 
are more important to others than they are to the self.  When identifying their own 
preferences, individuals will use low level, concrete construals.  As a result, individuals 
themselves will find feasibility considerations to be more important in determining their 
preferences than others’ preferences.   Therefore, it is predicted that individuals will predict 
that others will have a greater preference for the more desirable, albeit less feasible option, 
than they do themselves.  Additionally, the reverse should also hold.   It is predicted that 
people will indicate that their own preference for the more feasible, but less desirable option 
is greater than that of others.  
 It is also predicted that this effect will appear in the choices people make for others.  
Even though individuals may personally care extensively about feasibility, it is predicted that 
their preferences will shift when they make a choice for someone else. Specifically, when 
choosing for others, the goal is to make the best choice for the user.  If people perceive others 
to care more about desirability than feasibility, then people will perceive the best choice to be 
one that is more desirable than feasible. Consequently, when asked to choose between highly 
desirable and highly feasible options, they will choose the highly desirable option for others. 
In addition to examining direct choices made for others, another way to examine the self-
other effect is to see whether any differences emerge in why people return items purchased 
for them (i.e., gifts).   The dependent variable, likelihood to return, reflects preferences once 
a person is given a product.  No significant differences are expected in such circumstances, 
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but it does allow for another test of the self-other effect using a different scenario.2  
Therefore, the first set of hypotheses is: 
 
H1: Social distance (self vs. other) will shift preferences between desirability and 
feasibility considerations such that: 
 
H1A: Individuals will predict that others place more importance on 
desirability considerations than self does, and that self places more importance 
on feasibility considerations than others do. 
H1B: Individuals will choose more desirable, but less feasible options for 
others than oneself. 
 
The Moderating Role of Similarity 
 
Previous research has found that psychologically close others (e.g., friends and 
acquaintances) are perceived to be more similar to self than remote others (e.g., people in 
general; Brosius and Engel 1996).   Thus, when predicting the preferences of others, not all 
other people are perceived to be the same.  Specifically, when predicting others’ preferences, 
a key question a person may ask herself is how similar the other person is to oneself.  By 
perceiving the other to be similar to oneself, one may use one’s own preferences to predict 
the preferences of others.  For example, one’s spouse is presumed to have similar preferences 
to one’s own (Davis et al. 1986).   As a result, people may rely on their own preferences to 
predict those of close others, and as a result be more accurate in their predictions (Davis et al. 
1986).  Or the person can be completely dissimilar to oneself, as in the case of a stranger.  
Consequently, a person may predict that the distant other’s preferences are nothing like their 
own.  Similarity of the other is an important component of psychological distance, and has an 
                                                 
2 It is predicted that individuals will indicate that others are more likely to return a gift if it is 
highly feasible but not very desirable, because they will think that desirability considerations 
are very important to others.  On the other hand, it is predicted that people will indicate that 
they would be more likely to return a gift themselves if it was highly desirable but not very 
feasible, because feasibility considerations are important to them personally. 
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important role in the prediction of others’ preferences. 
Prior research has found that one’s best friend is more similar to oneself than the 
average undergraduate, and thus is perceived to be in the same risk category with similar risk 
preferences to oneself than the average undergraduate student (Chandran and Menon 2004).  
Additionally, it has been found that people perceive that political attacks ads will have a 
greater impact on others than they do on the self, and the self-other difference increases as 
the others becomes more geographically distant and less similar to themselves (Paek, Pan, 
Sun, Abisaid, and Houden 2005).  Supporting the arguments made by Davis and colleagues 
(1986), Paek and colleagues (2005) also contend that as the other becomes more distant and 
dissimilar, people are unable to compensate for their lack of knowledge about the other by 
using themselves as a proxy to make predictions.  Taken together, research has found that 
similarity of the other is a critical element of self-other differences.  Consequently, similarity 
is one of component relationship closeness that may lead to the attenuation of the self-other 
effect.  Therefore, I hypothesize that: 
 
H2: Similarity to the other will moderate the self-other effect such that the effect will 
be attenuated as similarity of other to the self becomes greater (i.e., as similarity 
increases, desirability considerations will become less important in predictions of 
others’ preferences and feasibility considerations will become more important in 
predictions of others’ preferences).    
 
 
The Effect of the Social Setting on Individuals’ Own Choices 
 
The self-other effect may not only influence the choices individuals make for others, 
but also the decisions they make for themselves. Specifically, in public, people perceive that 
others will be making judgments about them given the choices they make (Asch 1956; 
Deutsch and Gerard 1955; Diener et al. 1976; Schlenker, Britt, and Pennington 1996). When 
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individuals expect that others are evaluating their decisions, they will alter their decisions 
(Belk 1988; Calder and Burnkrant 1977; Ratner and Kahn 2002).  Additionally, if people 
know the attitudes of others, then they change what they say in public (Lerner and Tetlock 
1999). Therefore, research has found that individuals may make different choices in public 
settings than in private ones.   
There is also an extensive literature in the area of impression management 
(Baumeister 1982, 1986; Baumesiter and Tice 1986; Goffman 1959; Jones 1964; Jones and 
Pittman 1982; Leary and Kowalski 1990; Schlenker 1980, 1985; Schlenker and Weigold 
1990, 1992; Tedeschi 1986). Impression management has been defined as the behavior 
people engage in to protect their self-image and/or to influence the way they are perceived by 
others (Schlenker 1980). It has been found that people know that others form impressions of 
them, and treat them according to those perceptions (Goffman 1959). As a result, it is in 
one’s self-interest to manage the impressions others have of us.   Research has also found 
that people engage in impression management behavior in order to communicate a desired 
persona to others (Goffman 1959), increase one’s power over others (Jones and Pittman 
1982) and increase liking by others by appearing to be more similar to them (Baumeister and 
Tice (1986).  In summary, the impression management literature shows that people try to 
actively manage the impressions of others for a variety of reasons.  
In the context of the CLT, when people perceive that others care about desirability, 
they may not want to reveal that they care relatively more about feasibility. Therefore, they 
will adhere to the perceived norm and choose the high desirability option.  In private, 
however, people will not feel the need to conform to the perceived norm and will tend to 
choose more in the direction of the high feasibility option.  If individuals report different 
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preferences depending on the social setting (i.e., private or public) in which they are asked, 
then the self-other effect has real personal consequences.   Individuals’ perceptions of others’ 
preferences influences the choices people make for themselves.  In private, it is predicted that 
individuals are more likely to choose the highly feasible, but less desirable alternative that 
they are in public. Therefore, I hypothesize that: 
 
H3: The setting (private vs. public) will shift individuals’ own preferences between 
desirability and feasibility considerations such that in private individuals will indicate 
a greater preference for the highly feasible option than in public. 
  
 
Representation as the Underlying Mechanism of the Self-Other Effect 
Representation can be considered to be a continuum anchored by concreteness and 
abstractness.  Concrete representations are known, tangible and specific.  People can easily 
evoke concrete representations in their mind with great detail.  Abstract representations are 
unknown, intangible and non-specific.  People have greater difficulty evoking abstract 
representations because the details are unclear and the images are fuzzy.  Prior research has 
made the distinction between concrete and abstract representations by how directly an 
attribute corresponds to an object (Brown 1958; Paivio 1971).  If people are asked to think 
about a vehicle, thoughts are fairly abstract in that people can envision different types, 
models, styles, colors, etc. However, if people are asked to think about a new yellow 
Hummer, the representation evoked will be concrete with details specific to that object. 
In the self-other context, the self is more often than not represented concretely in the 
near future.  If asked what you would like to have for dinner today, one can picture her 
favorite lasagna with spicy tomato sauce and hot cheese. The representation may be so 
concrete one can say that they can actually taste the lasagna because it the item is known, 
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tangible and specific.  However, psychological distance (in the case achieved by social 
distance) leads to more abstract level representations (Trope and Liberman 2003, 2000; 
Werner and Kaplan 1963).  Whereas the self is represented concretely, other people are 
represented more abstractly. No matter how well we may know someone else, we did not 
have full knowledge of the other person.  Allport (1937, p. 497) says it best “…no person can 
understand any other person completely because no human being shares directly the motives, 
thoughts, and feelings of another.  The only self to which we have immediate access is our 
own.  Knowledge of other people comes to us indirectly and in fragments.”   Therefore, our 
perceptions of others’ preferences will always differ from our own to some degree.  If we 
were asked what he would like to have for dinner tonight, we may not be sure - maybe 
lasagna like us, but maybe not.  He may be in the mood for Mexican food or just dined at an 
Italian restaurant the night before.  The representations of the other are more abstract.  The 
dinner prediction is more difficult and uncertain, and the choices are less known, tangible and 
specific.  As CLT demonstrated with temporal distance, we often are not able to predict our 
own preferences accurately. Consequently, our prediction of others’ preferences should be 
even more flawed. 
According to the CLT, feasibility considerations refer to the subordinate how aspects 
or low-level construals.  On the other hand, desirability considerations refer to the 
superordinate why aspects of an action or high-level construals.  Given that concrete 
representations are low-level construals, feasibility considerations, which focus on the how 
aspects of the action, become important.  Additionally, given that abstract representations are 
high-level construals, desirability considerations, which focus on the why aspects of the 
action, become important.  Therefore, if the self is represented concretely, then feasibility 
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considerations should be very important to the self.  If others are represented with more 
abstract constuals, the desirability considerations should be perceived to be more important 
to others. The underlying mechanism for the self-other effect is predicted to be the level of 
representation.  One way to test this prediction is to see what would result if people were able 
to think of others in more concrete ways.  Would a concrete representation of the other lead 
people to predict that feasibility considerations are also important to others to some degree 
(i.e., to the same or weaker degree than their own strong preferences for highly feasible 
alternatives)?  Moreover, would changing the representation level of the other lead to the 
attenuation of the self-other effect?  If the level of representation is the underlying 
mechanism of the self-other effect, then the answer to these questions should be yes.  
Changing how others are represented (i.e., represented others with more concrete level 
construals) should lead to an attenuation of the self-other effect.   Therefore, I hypothesize 
that 
H4: As the representation of the other becomes more concrete, the self-other effect 
will be attenuated such that people will predict that others are more likely to choose 
the highly feasible alternative. 
 
 Prior research has examined how different evoked mindsets (abstract vs. concrete) 
change the recommendations people make to others (Freitas, Gollwitzer and Trope 2004).  In 
that research, a manipulation (e.g., the concrete mindset manipulation is used in this research 
in Study 6 and Study 6 Follow-up Study B, and the concrete and abstract manipulations were 
both used in Study 6 Follow-up Study A) was used to create either an abstract or concrete 
mindset.   The manipulation was a two-step thought exercise. The first part of the thought 
exercise required participants to read a passage about learning a new language.  Participants 
were asked to consider why (in the abstract manipulation) or how (in the concrete 
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manipulation) they do the things they do.  The abstract manipulation was designed to focus 
participants on the benefits whereas the concrete manipulation focused participants on the 
process of achieving a goal.  Participants were then asked to identify three ways learning a 
new language could help you meet an important life goal that you have (abstract 
manipulation condition) or identify three things they could do in order to learn a new 
language (concrete manipulation condition). Participants were then asked to rate how much 
engaging in this activity would help them meet the goal (abstract manipulation condition) or 
help them in the process (concrete manipulation condition).  In the second part of the 
thought-exercise, participants listed four specific outcomes (abstract manipulation condition) 
or process activities (concrete manipulation condition) of learning a new language. 
Participants were given an example with completed boxes for the goal of attaining life 
happiness that served as a guide for their task.  After completing the mindset manipulation, 
participants were asked to anticipate and suggest what others can do to improve their health 
by choosing between two options. One option was to take positive feedback about their 
strengths, which would have a more positive short-term outcome (i.e., highlighting one’s 
strengths is relatively easy and quick to implement). The other option was to take negative 
feedback about their weakness, which would have a more positive long-term outcome (i.e., 
improving one’s weakness is relatively difficult and time-consuming to implement).  
Participants in the concrete mindset recommended that others take the short-term positive 
feedback more than the participants in the abstract mindset.  Even though this research 
(Freitas et al. 2004) has examined the impact of different mindset (abstract vs. concrete) with 
regard to feasibility and desirability tradeoffs in the context of others, no known research has 
examined the role of the level of representation or different mindsets (abstract vs. concrete) 
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on the difference between own and others’ preferences.  The current research is designed to 
achieve this goal by adding the self-other component to this literature. 
 
Introduction Summary 
The main objective of this dissertation is to establish that social distance shifts levels 
of construal in a similar pattern as temporal distance and to study the impact of this shift of 
construals on the choices people make for others as well as themselves.  The dissertation 
begins by examining this effect in the context of making choices for others, and then explores 
how closeness of the relationship to the other moderates the self-other effect.  Different 
desirability considerations (i.e., brands and feature attractiveness) and feasibility 
considerations (i.e., price and product maintenance) will be used to study the tradeoffs 
individuals make between the two.   The self-other effect will be extended to show how it 
impacts the choices people make for themselves when in the social presence of others. 
Lastly, a possible underlying mechanism for the self-other efftect, the level of representation, 
will be explored to determine whether perceiving the other person more concretely will lead 
to an attenuation of the self-other effect. 
In the following sections, eight completed studies test whether individuals make 
different decisions for others than they do for themselves.   Study 1A tests whether 
individuals predict that others will have different preferences than their own in terms of the 
importance of desirability and feasibility considerations using brand and value subscales.  
Study 1B uses the same scales to provide initial evidence that closeness of the relationship to 
the other moderates the self-other effect.  Study 2 uses a choice scenario about a consumer 
product (i.e., laundry detergent), where desirability is manipulated by the brand of the 
product and feasibility is manipulated by its price.  Study 3 tests whether the self-other effect 
 18 
 
will emerge when the product is already in possession of the person and the feasibility 
consideration is care needed to use the product rather than price.  Study 4 tests the self-other 
effect using consumer experiences (i.e., selecting an amusement park). Study 5 uses the same 
stimuli as Study 4 to test whether individuals’ reports of their own preferences would change 
depending on the social setting (i.e., making a choice in the presence or absence of others) 
because they perceive that others value desirability considerations. Studies 6 and 7 explore 
the level of representation as the underlying mechanism for the self-other effect.  More 
specifically, these last two studies test whether making the level of representation of the other 
more concrete will lead to an attenuation of the self-other effect such that people will predict 
that feasibility considerations are also important to others (i.e., to the same or lesser degree as 
they are to themselves).
  
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 - STUDIES 
 
STUDY 1A: BRAND VS. QUALITY VS. VALUE SUBSCALES 
 
Study 1A used three established subscales to test whether individuals will predict that 
others place more importance on desirability considerations that they do, but that self places 
more importance on feasibility considerations than others do (Hypothesis 1A).  The first of 
these scales is the Brand Consciousness/Price Equals Quality Scale, which is a subscale of 
the Consumer Styles Inventory (Sproles and Kendall 1986; Sproles and Sproles 1990). The 
subscale is comprised of six items designed to measure “a consumer’s orientation toward 
buying the more expensive, well-known national brands (Sproles and Kendall 1986; Sproles 
and Sproles 1990).” The second of these subscales is the Perfectionist/High Quality 
Conscious Scale with seven items that was also developed as part of a Consumer Styles 
Inventory (Sproles and Kendall 1986; Sproles and Sproles 1990). It is defined to measure 
“the degree to which a consumer searches carefully and systematically for the best quality in 
products.” The third of these subscales is the Value Consciousness Scale, which is comprised 
of seven items developed as part of a set of price perception scales and is designed to 
measure “a concern for price paid relative to quality received (Lichtenstein, Ridgway and 
Netemeyer 1993).”  This study uses these subscales to measure how brand, quality and value 
conscious consumers are themselves and how brand, quality and value conscious they think 
others are.  Consuming a branded product is thought to be desirable. For example, people 
need clothes, but they want clothes from Nordstrom and are willing to pay more for the 
brand.  If brands were not highly desirable, then everything on store shelves would be 
 20 
 
generic products.  Therefore, it is predicted that individuals will indicate that others are more 
brand conscious than they are themselves.  Consuming a high quality product is also thought 
to be desirable.  For example, a low quality item may suffice, but people may want a higher 
quality version that will cost them more. Thus, it is predicted that people will indicate that 
others are more quality conscious than they are themselves.  Lastly, by definition, a value 
orientation is a feasibility consideration. Thus, it is predicted that people will indicate that 
they are more value conscious than others.   
 
Method 
 
Participants and design.  This study was a 2 (Target: Self vs. Other) x 2 (Order: Self First vs. 
Other First) mixed design with the first factor as manipulated within-subjects and the second 
factor manipulated between-subjects. One hundred thirteen MBAs (38 females and 75 males) 
completed the study during an hour-long experimental session.  As compensation for their 
participation, a donation was made on their behalf to a charity. 
The items of the three scales were randomized to create one new scale with 20 items. 
Sample items from the Brand Consciousness Scale include “1) The well-known national 
brands are for me, 2) The more expensive brands are usually my choices, and 3) I prefer 
buying the best selling brands.”  Sample items from the Perfectionist/High Quality Conscious 
Scale include “1) Getting very good quality is very important to me, 2) I make a special 
effort to choose the very best quality of products, and 3) My standards and expectations for 
products I buy are very high.”  Sample items from the Value Consciousness Scale include “1) 
I am very concerned about low prices, but I am equally concerned about product quality, 2) 
When grocery shopping, I compare the prices of different brands to be sure I get the best 
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value for the money, and 3) When I buy products, I like to be sure that I am getting my 
money’s worth.” The items were randomized and given in the same order to all participants.  
Procedure.  Participants completed the scales for themselves and others (average MBA 
student) in random order.  For the self questions, participants were instructed to “Please think 
about yourself when answering the following questions.  Please indicate the degree to which 
you agree or disagree with the following statements by writing a number from 1 to 5 next to 
the statement (1 = Strongly Disagree; 5 = Strongly Agree).”  For the other questions, 
participants were instructed to “Please think about the average UNC MBA student when 
answering the following questions.  Please indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree 
with the following statements by writing a number from 1 to 5 next to the statement (1 = 
Strongly Agree; 5 = Strongly Agree).” 
 
Results 
 
Effects of Brand Consciousness for Self vs. Other. The alphas for the Brand Consciousness 
Subscale were .80 for the self condition and .84 for the other condition.  A significant self-
other difference was found where individuals indicated that they care less about brands (M = 
2.90) than others do (M = 3.26; F(1, 112) = 23.29, p < .001).  Order was not significant (F(1, 
112) = .59, p = .44, ns), and neither was gender (F(1, 112) = .00, p = .99, ns). Gender did not 
have a significant main or interactive effect in this study or in any of the other studies.  
Therefore, gender will not be discussed further.   
Effects of Quality Consciousness for Self vs. Other.  The alphas for the Quality 
Consciousness Subscale were .78 for the self condition and .70 for the other condition.  No 
self-other difference was found between self (M = 4.01) and other (M = 3.97, F(1, 109) = .71, 
p = .40, ns).    
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Effects of Value Consciousness for Self vs. Other. The alphas for the Value Consciousness 
Subscale were .87 for the self condition and .76 for the other condition.  A significant self-
other difference was found whereby individuals indicated that they care more about value (M 
= 3.89) than others do (M = 3.64; F(1, 112) = 12.90, p < .001).  There was no effect of order 
(F(1, 112) = .06, p = .80, ns). 
Effects of Brand and Value Consciousness for Self vs. Other.   Participants indicated that they 
are more value conscious (M = 3.89) than brand conscious (M = 2.90; t(1, 112) = 8.80, p < 
.001).  Participants indicated that others also are more value conscious (M = 3.64) than brand 
conscious (M = 3.26; t(1, 112) = 4.34, p < .001).  Even though they think that value is more 
important than brands to both oneself and others, people think that value is more important to 
them than others and that brands are more important to others than to themselves. See Figure 
1. 
 
Discussion 
 
The results of this study provide evidence that people place more importance on 
feasibility considerations than others do and believe that others value desirability 
considerations more than self does. In this study, people thought that others cared more about 
brands (i.e., which are desirable) than they do (i.e., Brand Consciousness was considered to 
be a desirability attribute), and less about value than they do (i.e., Value Consciousness was 
considered to be a feasibility attribute).  Using the third subscale measuring Quality 
Consciousness did not yield the predicted difference between self and others. Participants did 
not indicate that others prefer quality more than they do.  It might be that quality 
encompasses both feasibility and desirability considerations.  If a product is not easy to use 
(i.e., not feasible), then it may be judged to be of poor quality.  If the quality of a product is 
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good, then it may be thought of as better than its competitors and thus highly desirable.  
Therefore, only the Value and Brand Consciousness Subscales will be used in the following 
study. 
 
STUDY 1B: BRAND VS. VALUE SCALES WITH CLOSENESS OF THE 
RELATIONSHIP TO THE OTHER AS A MODERATOR 
 
Study 1B is designed to replicate the prior study by testing whether individuals will 
predict that others care more about desirability considerations that they do, and reveal that 
they care more about feasibility considerations than they think others do (Hypothesis 1A).  
Additionally, the goal of this study is to identify closeness of the relationship to the other as a 
moderator of the self-other effect (Hypothesis 2).   Study 1B uses two of three subscales used 
in Study 1A – the Brand Consciousness/Price Equals Quality Scale (Sproles and Kendall 
1986; Sproles and Sproles 1990) and the Value Consciousness Scale (Lichtenstein, Ridgway 
and Netemeyer 1993).  As in Study 1A, consumption of a branded product is considered to 
be desirable, and it is predicted that individuals will indicate that others are more brand 
conscious than they are themselves.  Value consciousness is a feasibility consideration, and it 
is predicted that people will indicate that they are more value conscious than others.   
Social distance is a function of how similar or different the target other is perceived to 
be to the self.  Prior research has distinguished different target others by their level of 
vividness (Hsee and Weber 1997) with random others viewed as abstract and close others 
viewed as vivid.  When the target is vivid, Hsee and Weber (1997) find that prediction errors 
do not occur (i.e., people do not incorrectly predict that others are more risk seeking than 
they are).  However, when the target is abstract, prediction errors occur because people 
perceived the target not to be like them and thus were less likely to use their own preferences 
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to guide their prediction of others’ preferences.  In this research, I predict that people’s 
predictions of others’ preferences will differ from their own because even close others are not 
represented as concretely as oneself, and therefore making prediction requires some abstract 
construals.   As a result, it is predicted that as the relationship to the other person becomes 
closer and the target becomes less abstract the self-other difference will be attenuated. In 
other words, individuals may think that random others prefer branded products (i.e., highly 
desirably items) much more than they do, but their friends prefer branded products only 
slightly more than they do themselves. Similarly, individuals may think random others are 
much less value oriented than they are, but their friends are only slightly less value oriented 
than they are themselves.   
 
Method 
 
Participants and design. This study was a 2 (Target: Self vs. Other) x 2 (Other: Randomly 
selected UNC undergraduate student vs. UNC undergraduate student who is a good friend of 
yours) mixed design with the first factor manipulated within-subjects and the second factor 
manipulated between-subjects. Undergraduate participants (N = 95; 40 males and 45 
females) completed the study as part of a 30-minute session for which they were paid $7.  
The items from two of the subscales used in Study 1A (Brand Consciousness and Value 
Consciousness) were randomized and given in the same order to the participants. 
Procedure. Participants completed the scale first for themselves and then for others (either a 
randomly selected UNC undergraduate student or a UNC undergraduate student who is a 
good friend of yours). 3  For the self-condition, participants were instructed to “Please 
                                                 
3 Order of the completion of the scale for self and other was not manipulated because order 
was found not to be a significant factor in Study 1A. 
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indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with the following statements by circling a 
number from 1 to 5 below each statement.”  For the distant other condition, participants were 
instructed to “Now, please indicate the degree to which you think a randomly selected UNC 
undergraduate student would agree or disagree with the following statements.” For the close 
other condition, participants were instructed to “Now, please indicate the degree to which 
you think a UNC undergraduate student who is a good friend of yours would agree or 
disagree with the following statements.”  Each item was followed by a 5-point Likert scale 
anchored by 1 = Strongly Disagree and 5 = Strongly Agree. 
 
Results 
 
Effects of Brand Consciousness for Self vs. Other.   The alphas for the Brand Consciousness 
Subscale were .73 for the self condition and .88 for the other condition.  Consistent with 
Study 1A, the self-other difference was significant with individuals indicating that others (M 
= 3.63) care more about brands than they do (M = 2.74; F(1, 94) = 72.62, p < .001).  
Effects of Value Consciousness for Self vs. Other.   The alphas for the Value Consciousness 
Subcale were .77 for the self-condition and .78 for the other-condition.  Consistent with 
Study 1A, the self-other difference is significant with people indicating that they care more 
about value (M = 4.20) than others do (M = 3.56; F(1, 94) = 56.43, p < .001).  
The Moderating Role of the Other Condition.  A MANOVA was conducted with the Brand 
and Value Consciousness Scales as the two dependent variables and the other condition 
(friend vs. random other) as the independent variable.  An overall marginally significant 
effect of the other condition was found (F(2, 93) = 2.95, p = .06).  For the Brand 
Consciousness Scale, no significant differences were found between friends and random 
others (F(1, 94) = .49, p = .48, ns), but a significant difference was found between friends 
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and random others for the Value Consciousness Scale (F(1, 94) = 5.74, p = .02) with 
participants reporting that value would be more important to their friends (M = 3.72) than to 
random others (M = 3.41).  See Figures 2 and 3.   
 
Discussion  
 
Replicating Study 1A, this study also finds that individuals indicated that brands are 
more important to others than they are to themselves.  It was predicted that closeness of the 
relationship to the other would moderate the effect such that people would indicate that 
distant others would value brands more than their friends.  Although the results were 
directionally consistent, individuals did not significantly indicate that brands would be more 
important to distant others than to their friends.  However, individuals did indicate that both 
their friends and distant others would value brands more than themselves.   
Also replicating Study 1A, it was found that individuals indicated that value is more 
important to themselves than to others.  It was predicted that closeness of the relationship to 
the other would moderate the self-other effect.  Specifically, individuals themselves would 
place a lot of importance on value, and think that value is less important to their friends and 
even less important to random others.   This result was found, and provides preliminary 
evidence that the closeness of the relationship to the other moderates the self-other effect.  
 
 
 
STUDY 2: LAUNDRY DETERGENT STUDY 
 
The results from the first two studies indicate that individuals perceive others to care 
more about desirability considerations and less about feasibility considerations than they do.  
Study 2 is designed to test whether this effect will translate into the choices people make for 
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others (Hypothesis 1B).   Even though individuals may predict that others have different 
preferences from their own, they may choose the same option for both themselves and others.  
Therefore, this study is designed to determine whether the effect will appear when 
individuals are asked to make choices for others as well as themselves.  Additionally, the first 
two studies measured individuals’ preferences and their prediction of others’ preferences for 
brands. This study uses a specific consumer product (i.e., laundry detergent) to test whether 
individuals will be more likely to choose highly desirable, but less feasible product (i.e., a 
national brand laundry detergent) for others than they are for themselves.  
Participants will be asked to choose between two types of laundry detergent.  One 
option will be labeled a National Brand (i.e., the highly desirable, but less feasible option) 
and the other will be labeled a Store Brand (i.e., the highly feasible, but less desirable 
option).  Research has found that price is the main factor for the purchase of Store Brands, 
and National Brands are often perceived as offering higher quality than Store Brands 
(Prendergast and Marr 1997).  When deciding which type of product to purchase, people 
tradeoff quality for price (Prendergast and Marr 1995, 1997, Szymanski and Busch 1987, 
Yelkur 2000).  The study was designed so that the national brand laundry detergent would be 
considered highly desirable due to its brand, but less feasible given its higher price.  The 
store brand would be perceived as highly feasible due to its lower price, but seen as less 
desirable because it lacks a well-known name brand and consequently may be seen as a 
lower quality product.  It was predicted that people would be more likely to choose the 
national brand for others than for themselves. 
 
Method 
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Participants and design.   This study was a 2 (Brand: Store vs. National) x 2 (Target: Self vs. 
Other) mixed design with the first factor manipulated between-subjects and the second factor 
manipulated within-subjects.  The study was run with three different populations.  In the first 
data collection, data were collected during a 50-minute session for which the undergraduate 
participants were paid $10 in compensation. In the second data collection, data were 
collected from the members of several sports teams as part of an hour session for which the 
undergraduate students were paid $10 in compensation. In both the first and second data 
collections, data were collected from undergraduate students (N = 162). The data were 
collapsed across these two data collections, and will not be discussed separately. In the third 
data collection, data were collected from MBA students (N = 126) as part of an hour session 
for which a $10 donation was made on their behalf to a charity or sports team. A total of 288 
students participated in this study. 
Procedure.  All participants were asked to consider the following scenario “Imagine that you 
are going to the grocery store, and one of the products you need to purchase is laundry 
detergent.  While in the store, you narrow your choice down to the following two laundry 
detergents.” Participants were then presented with two brands (one store and one national 
brand) of the same product (i.e., laundry detergent). The one identified as the “Store Brand” 
was cheaper with a price of $4.99 and the one identified as the “National Brand” was more 
expensive with a price of $5.99.  The two products were only identified as the “Store Brand” 
or the “National Brand” rather than with actual national (i.e., Tide, Wisk) or store (i.e., Harris 
Teeter, Food Lion) brand names so that any specific brand associations would not effect the 
results. 
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Participants were then asked the two main dependent variables: “Which of the two 
laundry detergents would you buy for yourself?” and “If a friend had asked you to purchase 
laundry detergent during your trip to the grocery store, but had not specified a particular 
brand, which one would you choose for him/her?” The order in which the dependent 
variables were asked was randomly assigned.  Participants indicated their choice for 
themselves as well as others on a 7-point scale where 1 = Definitely National Brand and 7 = 
Definitely Store Brand.  Lastly, participants responded to two questions, which served as the 
manipulation checks. The first question asked, “Which of the two brands of laundry 
detergent do you find more desirable?” The second asked, “Which of the two brands of 
laundry detergent do you find more feasible?” For both question, participants indicated their 
response on a 7-point scale where 1 = Definitely National Brand and 7 = Definitely Store 
Brand. 
 
Results 
 
Manipulation Checks.  Participants indicated that the national brand was more desirable (M = 
3.15), and significantly different from the midpoint of the scale (M = 4.0; t(1, 287) = 8.44, p 
< .001).  As expected, participants indicated that the store brand was more feasible (M = 
4.57), and was significantly different from the midpoint of the scale (M = 4.0; t(1, 287) = 
6.28, p < .001).  A paired t-test revealed that the two means were significantly different from 
each other (paired t (1, 287) = 14.04, p < .001). 
Effects of Choice for Self vs. Other.  As predicted, a significant main effect for self-other was 
found with participants indicating that they would be more likely to purchase the store brand 
for themselves (M = 4.23) than they would for others (M = 3.80; F(1, 287) = 11.20, p = .001). 
Individuals indicated a self preference for the national brand (M = 4.23) which is marginally 
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significantly different than the midpoint of the scale (M = 4.0; t(1, 287) = 1.72, p = .09). 
Other preference (M = 3.80) was not significantly different from the midpoint of the scale (M 
= 4.0; t(1, 287) = 1.58, p = .12) Thus, the self-other difference emerges as significant in the 
predicted direction, but neither self choice nor other choice is significantly different than the 
midpoint of the scale.  Results are summarized in Table 1. 
The order in which the participants chose for self and others was counterbalanced, 
and was found not to be significant (F (1, 287) = .01, p = .94, ns). The interaction between 
self-other and order was also not significant (F (1, 287) = .84, p = .36, ns).  Consequently, 
order will not be discussed further. 
Effects of Different Student Populations as Participants. A significant main effect of the 
sample population emerged (F(1, 286) = 44.37, p < .001) revealing that there are different 
perceptions of national and generic brands among the two sample populations 
(undergraduates vs. MBAs).  However, the interaction between target (self vs. other) and 
sample population (undergraduates vs. MBAs) is not significant (F(1, 286) = 1.21, p = .27, 
ns). For self, undergraduates were more likely to choose the store brand (M = 4.80) as 
compared to the MBAs (M = 3.51; F(1, 287) = 24.18, p < .001).  The undergraduates’ self 
preference is for the Store Brand whereas the MBAs prefer the National Brand for 
themselves.  For others, undergraduates were also more likely to choose the store brand (M = 
4.49) than the MBAs (M = 2.91; F(1, 287) = 42.96, p < .001).   Again, the undergraduates 
think that others would prefer the Store Brand whereas the MBAs think that others would 
prefer the National Brand.  Although the self-other difference is robust among both of these 
sample populations, it is evident that both self and other preferences between these two 
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options (i.e., store vs. national brand) differ.  These differences may have emerged due to 
different levels of income and affordability for the two sample populations.     
 
Discussion 
 
The results of this study show that individuals have a greater likelihood to choose the 
more feasible option for themselves than for others. This study also shows that the self-other 
effect is robust among different populations.  In this study, the more desirable option was 
operationalized using a national brand, which are considered to be desirable due to higher 
quality perceptions and greater marketing awareness.  Feasibility was manipulated by the 
cost of the product (i.e., affordability is a feasibility consideration).  National brands are 
almost always costlier than store brands. Therefore, the use of national vs. store brands 
proved to be good stimuli in testing Hypothesis 1B. 
In Studies 1A and 1B, preferences for self and others were the dependent variables.  
In Study 2, the likeliness to purchase for self and others served as the dependent variables. 
Both preferences and likelihood to purchase are direct measures of the importance of 
desirability and feasibility in people’s own preferences and their prediction of others’ 
preferences. Study 3 uses another dependent variable (i.e., the likelihood to return an item 
purchased for you) to test whether individuals place more importance on feasibility 
consideration than others, but predict that others value desirability considerations more than 
they do themselves. 
 
STUDY 3: SWEATER STUDY 
 
In the prior studies, price or value was the feasibility consideration.  Study 3 tests 
Hypothesis 1A using another feasibility consideration (i.e., type of care needed to use the 
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product) to test whether individuals will predict that feasibility considerations are more 
important to themselves than they are to others.  Desirability considerations are manipulated 
by the brand of the product (i.e., high-end or low-end designer label), and it is predicted that 
others will indicate that desirability considerations are more important to others than they are 
to themselves. 
Study 3 also uses a new scenario in which people are told that they received an item 
as a gift.  People are asked to assume that the item is already in their possession.  Then, they 
are asked whether they would return the item to the store. Thus, the dependent variable in 
this study is likelihood to return, and it is a more indirect measure than preference or choice.  
Likelihood to return was chosen as the dependent variable in this study because it tests 
Hypothesis 1A in a scenario where an item presumed to be on a person’s possession. Having 
the item in one’s possession is not expected to significantly alter the self-other results, but 
rather provides another context in which to study the self-other effect. Although people may 
experience an endowment effect for self in this gift scenario (e.g., they may be more reluctant 
to return an item that has become part of their endowment; Thaler 1980), they will find it 
easier to return the non-feasible item than the non-desirable one. Thus, it is predicted that 
despite any overall endowment effect (which could produce lower overall likelihood to return 
for self than others), the self-other effect will continue to emerge with individuals predicting 
that others care more about desirability considerations than they do (i.e., others will return 
the non-desirable item rather than the non-feasible one), and indicating that they care more 
about feasibility considerations than others do (i.e., they will be more likely return the non-
feasible item rather than the non-desirable one).  
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In this study, participants were asked to imagine either giving or receiving a gift. If 
they were asked about giving the gift, participants reported how likely they think the 
recipient is to return that gift.  If they were asked about receiving the gift, participants 
reported how likely they would be to return the gift.  When presented with two options, one 
highly desirable but less feasible and the other highly feasible but less desirable, it was 
predicted that people will think that others are more likely to return a high feasibility, low 
desirability item than they would be themselves. 
 
Method 
 
Participants and design. This study was a 2 (Recipient: Self vs. Other) x 2 (Condition: High 
Desirability/Low Feasibility vs. High Feasibility/Low Desirability) between-subjects design, 
and was run as part of an hour-long session for which the undergraduates were given 1 hour 
of course credit for their participation.  One hundred forty-one undergraduate participants (45 
females and 96 males) completed the study. 
 Condition was manipulated by changing the features of a product (i.e., sweater). 
Desirability was manipulated by the brand label of the sweater. The high desirability sweater 
was described as a “High-end designer label” and the low desirability sweater was described 
as a “Low-end designer label.”  Feasibility was manipulated by how the sweater could be 
cleaned. The high feasibility sweater was described as “Machine washable” and the low 
feasibility sweater was described as “Dry clean only.”  Therefore, participants evaluated two 
sweaters – one was highly desirable (high-end designer label) but not very feasible (dry clean 
only) and the other was highly feasible (machine washable) but not very desirable (low-end 
designer label). Both sweaters were described as a “Half-zip sweater, with contrast stripe at 
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interior neck,” priced at $34.99, and presented with a simple black and white picture that was 
identical in both conditions.   
Procedure. Participants were instructed to: “Imagine that it is your best friend’s [your] 
birthday, and you have [your best friend] decided to give him/her [you] a gift.  You [He/she] 
went shopping and selected the gift below as the gift for your best friend [you].”  Then 
participants were presented with one of two sweaters. Half of the participants were asked to 
evaluate the sweater as a potential gift they were giving to their friend and the other half of 
the participants to evaluate the sweater as a gift they received from their friend.  When giving 
the sweater as a gift (other recipient condition), participants were asked, “How likely do you 
think it is that your friend would return or exchange this gift?”  When receiving the sweater 
as a gift (self recipient condition), participants were asked, “How likely do you think it is that 
you would return or exchange this gift?”  Participants indicated the likeliness to return on a 
7-point scale anchored by 1 = Very Unlikely; 7 = Very Likely). 
 
Results 
 
No significant main effect of recipient (F(1, 140) = .04, p = .84, ns) nor condition 
(F(1, 140) = .01, p = .92, ns) was found, but a significant interaction did emerge (F(1, 140) = 
4.46, p = .04) where people predicted that their friend was more likely to return the sweater if 
was low on desirability whereas they were equally likely to return both of the sweaters. A 
series of simple effects tests revealed that those who gave the gift indicated that others would 
be more likely to return the low-end, machine washable sweater (low desirability/high 
feasibility) than the high-end, dry clean only sweater (high desirability/low feasibility) (Ms = 
3.54 and 2.87, respectively; F(1, 76) = 2.95, p = .09).  Those who received the gift indicated 
that they would be equally likely to return the high-end, dry clean only sweater (high 
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desirability/low feasibility) and the low-end, machine washable sweater (low 
desirability/high feasibility; Ms = 2.84 and 3.44, respectively; F(1, 63) = 1.68, p = .19, ns).  
See Figure 4. 
Consequently, participants predicted that others would be more sensitive to the 
desirability of the gift; they predicted that others would be more likely to return the sweater if 
it was a low-end designer label even if it was very feasible (i.e., machine washable).  For 
themselves, the means were directionally consistent with predictions that individuals would 
be more likely to return the less feasible sweater even if it was very desirable (i.e., high-end 
designer label).  However, no significant differences were found. Individuals were equally 
likely to return the highly desirable, but less feasible and the highly feasible, but less 
desirable sweater. 
 
Discussion 
 
In addition to the prior two studies that used the prediction of others’ preferences and 
choice for others, this study revealed the self-other effect using likelihood to return an item 
purchased for you by someone else.  The study found that people think others are more likely 
to return a highly feasible gift that is not desirable whereas they are equally likely to return 
both a highly feasible gift that is not desirable and a highly desirable gift that is not feasible.  
The following study moves from consumer products to consumer experiences, and tests 
whether individuals think desirability considerations are more important, and feasibility 
considerations are less important, to others than to themselves. 
 
STUDY 4: AMUSEMENT PARK STUDY 
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Study 1 tests whether social distance (self vs. other) will shift the importance of 
desirability and feasibility considerations in determining one’s preferences (Hypothesis 1A).  
In the previous studies, scenarios pertaining to consumer products (i.e., laundry detergent and 
sweaters) were used as the stimuli to test the self-other effect.  In this study, as well as Study 
5, consumer experiences (selecting an amusement park) were used to determine whether the 
results extend to other consumer contexts.  Desirability was manipulated using a feature of 
the experience rather than a brand name in order to see whether the results generalize beyond 
the desirability of brands.  Feasibility was manipulated using driving time rather than cost or 
type of care needed.  It is predicted that the self-other effect again will emerge, with 
individuals reporting a greater preference for an amusement park that requires less driving 
time (i.e., the more feasible option) than they think others do. 
 
Method 
 
Participants and design.  This study was a simple 2 cell (Target: Self vs. Other) design with 
the one factor manipulated within subjects. Seventy-four participants (46 females and 28 
males) completed the study as part of an hour session in return for one hour of course credit. 
Procedure.  Participants were presented with two amusement parks: Amusement Park A has 
several new rides, but is four hours away (high desirability/low feasibility) and Amusement 
Park B has no new rides, but is two hours away (low desirability/high feasibility).  
Participants were asked to indicate which amusement park they would prefer to go and also 
indicated what their friends’ overall preference is.  Participants indicated their preference as 
well as that of others on a 7-point Likert scale anchored by 1 = Strongly Prefer Amusement 
Park A; 7 = Strongly Prefer Amusement Park B.  Participants were asked several specific 
questions to tap into how important desirability and feasibility considerations are to them.  
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Specifically, participants were asked to indicate how important the newness of the rides is to 
them versus others and how important the driving distance is to them versus others.  
Participants provided their responses to both questions on a 7-point Likert scale anchored by 
1 = Not At All Important; 7 = Extremely Important.  Two manipulation checks were also 
included. The first asked participants which amusement park they would more enjoy 
spending the day at (1 = Enjoy Amusement Park A More; 7 = Enjoy Amusement Park B 
More).  The second asked which amusement park is easier to get to (1 = Amusement Park A 
Is Easier To Get To; 7 = Amusement Park B Is Easier To Get To). 
 
Results 
 
Manipulation Check. Participants indicated that they would more enjoy spending a day at 
Amusement Park A (M = 2.66) compared to the scale midpoint (M = 4.0; t (1, 73) = 7.16, p < 
.001), but that Amusement Park B is easier to get to (M = 6.20) compared to the scale 
midpoint (M = 4.0; t (1, 73) = 14.78, p < .001).  Therefore, participants viewed the two 
options consistently with the study design that Amusement Park A is more desirable option 
and Amusement Park B is more feasible option. 
Effects of Preferences of Self vs. Other. Participants indicated that they were neutral between 
the two parks (M = 4.01), but that their friends would have a greater preference for the 
desirable, but further away Amusement Park A (M = 3.69; paired t(73) = 2.29, p = .03). 
Although it was predicted that participants would have a preference for the closer, but less 
desirable Amusement Park B (not be neutral between the two amusement parks), the 
direction of results is consistent with predictions with participants indicating that they would 
prefer Amusement Park A less than they think their friends would.  Participants indicated 
that newness of the rides (i.e., desirability of the amusement park’s features) is more 
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important to their friends (M = 4.81) than to themselves (M = 4.53; paired t (73) = 1.94, p = 
.06).  Participants indicated that driving distance (i.e., feasibility to get to the amusement 
park) was equally important to themselves (M = 4.97) and their friends (M = 4.78); paired t 
(73) = 1.27, p = .21, ns).  Means are directionally consistent with predictions that driving 
distance would be more important to self than others.   
 
Discussion 
 
 It was found that individuals indicate that others will have a greater preference for a 
highly desirable albeit less feasible consumer experience than a highly feasible, but less 
desirable alternative.  For themselves, individuals revealed that they were indifferent between 
a consumer experience that was highly desirable, but less feasible and one that was highly 
feasible, but less desirable.   Therefore, choices involving consumer experiences show a 
similar self-other effect as consumer products.  Individuals think others care more about 
desirability considerations than they do.   Additionally, this study used different attributes 
than prior studies to manipulate desirability considerations (i.e., newness of the rides rather 
than brand name) and feasibility considerations (i.e., driving time rather than price or type of 
care needed), and again the self-other effect emerged. 
 
STUDY 5: AMUSEMENT PARK STUDY WITH PUBLIC/PRIVATE 
MANIPULATION 
 
Because people think others value desirability considerations more than they do, it 
may be the case that people change their own preferences in public to match those of others 
(Hypothesis 3). Previous research has suggested that people will alter their consumption 
choices if they expect that others will evaluate their decisions (Belk 1988; Calder and 
Burnkrant 1977; Ratner and Kahn 2002).  It has also been found that individuals will make 
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decisions other than those they would privately favor when they expect others may form 
impressions of them based upon the decisions they make (Asch 1956; Deutsch and Gerard 
1955; Diener et al. 1976; Schlenker, Britt, and Pennington 1996). Moreover, people engage 
in impression management behavior in order to communicate a desired persona to others 
(Goffman 1959).  When behaviors are perceived to be private or anonymous, people feel less 
compelled to perform behaviors consistent with the opinions of others.   
Therefore, Study 5 was designed to test whether people would report different 
preferences for a consumer experience depending on the social setting in which they were 
asked.  If people report different preferences for themselves in public versus private settings, 
then the effect has real implications on the choices people not only make for others, but also 
for themselves.  Using the same stimuli as Study 4, participants are expected to express a 
greater likelihood to vote to go to the more desirable, less feasible amusement park than to 
the more feasible, less desirable amusement park when their vote is public (versus private) 
due to their thoughts that others’ preferences will also be for the more desirable option..  In 
private, participants will be more likely to express their true preference which will be for the 
highly feasible, but less desirable amusement park. 
Method 
 
Participants and design. The study was a simple 2-cell between subjects design (Response: 
Public vs. Private).  One hundred eight undergraduate students completed the study (64 
females and 44 males). A similar design was used to the previous Amusement Park Study 
(Study 4).  Specifically, participants were asked to imagine that a group of their friends had 
decided to take a trip to an amusement park next weekend and to consider two amusement 
park alternatives.  Amusement Park A (i.e., the highly desirable option) had new rides, but 
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was four hours away by car.  Amusement Park B (i.e., the highly feasible option) had no new 
rides, but was only two hours away by car. 
Procedure.  Half of the participants were randomly assigned to the private condition and 
were asked: “If your friends were to take a secret ballot vote (where others would not know 
your preference), which option would you vote for?” The other half of the participants were 
randomly assigned to the public condition and were asked to answer the following question: 
“If your friends were to take a hand vote (where others would know your preference), which 
option would you vote for?”   Participants indicated their responses by selecting either 
Amusement Park A or B.  Two questions were asked as manipulation checks to confirm that 
participants perceived one amusement park as highly desirable and the other as highly 
feasible: “Which amusement park would you more enjoy spending a day at? (1 = Enjoy 
Amusement Park A More; 7 = Enjoy Amusement Park B More)” and “Which amusement park 
is easier to get to? (1 = Amusement Park A Is Easier To Get To; 7 = Amusement Park B Is 
Easier To Get To).” 
 
Results 
 
Manipulation Checks. Consistent with our intended design of the study, participants 
indicated that they would enjoy spending the day more at Amusement Park A (M = 3.06) 
compared to the scale midpoint (M = 4.0; t(1, 107) = 5.63, p < .001) and that Amusement 
Park B was easier to get to (M = 6.16) compared to the scale midpoint (M = 4.0; t(1, 107) = 
16.90, p < .001). 
Effects of Public and Private Conditions on Self Preferences.  As predicted, in the public 
condition, more participants (63%) indicated that they would vote for the desirable 
Amusement Park A (N = 34) than Amusement Park B (N = 20) whereas in the private 
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condition more participants (61%) indicated that they would vote for the feasible Amusement 
Park B (N = 33) than Amusement Park A (N = 21; χ2 = 6.26, p < .05).  See Figure 5. In other 
words, more participants chose the highly desirable amusement park in public when they 
knew that their friends would know which of the two amusement parks they were voting for.  
However, when they believed that their friends would not know their vote because of a secret 
ballot, more participants chose the highly feasible amusement park.   
 
Discussion 
 
This study shows that people report different preferences when in a public setting.  
Specifically, individuals were more likely to choose a more desirable, less feasible option in 
public, but a more feasible, less desirable option in private.  This finding shows that people 
perceive others to care about desirability considerations, and report preferences to match 
those of others when asked to do so in public.  As a result, the self-other effect impacts not 
only the choices individuals make for others, but also the choice they make for themselves.   
Two scales were also included in the data collection and analysis – social desirability and 
self-monitoring.  Social desirability was included to rule out the possibility that one option 
was more attractive to those who scored high versus low on social desirability or that 
endorsing a particular option was driven by social desirability (i.e., not authentic).  No 
significant social desirability results were found.  Self-monitoring was included to determine 
whether the high self-monitors were more sensitive to the public manipulation than low self-
monitors.  No significant self-monitoring results were found. 
One limitation of this study is that the scenario was hypothetical in nature. 
Participants imagined themselves voting for one of the two amusement park options either in 
public or private.  An actual vote in a public versus private setting was not taken.  Four 
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follow-up studies tested whether this public/private effect would replicate in an actual social 
setting (i.e., public vs. private). In all the studies, participants made actual choices between 
the two options where they actually received their choice if they were selected as the winner 
of a lottery.   No significant public/private effects were found in any of the four studies.   
In the first study, which asked participants to choose between a highly feasible, but 
less desirable coffee shop (Ram Café) and a highly desirable, but less desirable coffee shop 
(Starbucks), almost all the participants chose the highly desirable coffee shop regardless of 
condition (i.e., public or private).  In private, 18 of 20 participants (90%) chose Starbucks 
over Ram Café; in public, 19 of 20 participants (95%) chose Starbucks (χ2(1)  = .36, ns).  It 
was speculated that the highly feasible coffee shop may not have been perceived to be as 
feasible as the pretest indicated because the location of the pretest and study differed. 
Therefore, a second study was run in which the highly feasible coffee shop option was 
located in the same building as the study (Café McColl), and the highly desirable alternative 
was the same one as in the prior study (Starbucks). In this study, there was more variance in 
choice, but there were no significant differences in choice between the public and private 
conditions. In private, 18 of 23 participants (78%) chose Starbucks over Café McColl; in 
public 19 of 26 participants (73%) chose Starbucks (χ2(1)  = .18, ns).   Study 3 used the 
original coffee shop stimuli and was run in the same location as where the pretest was run 
and the highly feasible coffee shop is located. No signficant  main effect of condition (public 
vs. private) was found. In private, 37 of 45 participants (82%) chose Starbucks over Ram 
Café; in public 32 of 46 participants (70%) chose Starbucks (χ2(1) = 1.99, p = .12, ns).   
Study 4 tested the same predictions with a different set of stimuli (i.e., soda).  Participants 
were asked to choose between 12 cans of Coca-Cola (a highly desirable brand, but less 
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quantity) and 24 cans of Sam’s Choice (a less desirable brand, but more quantity) in public or 
private.  Again no significant differences in choice were found between the public and 
private conditions. In private, 42 of 62 participants (67.7%) chose Coca-Cola over Sam’s 
Choice; in public 38 of 58 participants (65.5%) chose Coca-Cola (χ2(1)  = .07, ns). 
There are at least two reasons why the actual studies may not have replicated the 
results of the hypothetical study (Study 5).  The first reason is the stimuli. The hypothetical 
study presented and varied the feasibility and desirability importance of only those two 
attributes. When there are only two attributes under consideration where one is highly 
feasible and the other is highly desirable, a significant public/private emerges.  In actual 
study, numerous pretests were run to find a pair of actual stimuli that have two primary 
attributes that vary on the dimensions of desirability and feasibility. The sets of stimuli 
tested, but not chosen were Amusement Parks (Carowinds – a smaller park requiring less 
travel time vs. Walt Disney World – a larger park requiring more travel time), Mexican 
Restaurants (Cosmic Cantina  - lower CitySearch rating closer to campus vs. Carrburritos 
Taqueria – higher CitySearch rating further away from campus), Movie Theaters (Carolina 
Theatre – lower CitySearch rating closer to campus vs. Southpoint Cinemas – higher 
CitySearch rating further away from campus), Southern Cuisine Restaurants (Mama Dip’s – 
lower CitySearch rating closer to campus vs. Magnolia Grill – higher CitySearch rating 
further away from campus), Shopping Malls (University Mall – smaller mall closer to 
campus vs. The Streets at Southpoint – larger mall further away from campus), and Retail 
Stores (Wal-Mart – older store closer to campus vs. Target – newer store further away from 
campus).  A significant self-other effect where people preferred the highly feasible option for 
themselves, but indicated that others would prefer the highly desirable option was not found 
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in any of these pretests.  It is the case that real products and services have many attributes 
that vary in terms of feasibility and desirability considerations, as well as other unrelated 
attributes that may also be important and lead to purchase.  Even though two attributes may 
appear to be the major distinguishing attributes or are made salient, it is not guaranteed that 
participants will use only these two attributes in making their decisions. 
The second reason why the actual studies may not have replicated the results of Study 
5 is the manipulation of the social setting (public vs. private). In the hypothetical study, 
participants were asked to imagine voting in private by secret ballot or in public by hand 
vote. No actual vote was taken.  The question is whether participants are able to envision the 
public setting, and predict their behavior in such a setting correctly.  In the actual studies, 
participants made their choices either in private by writing down their preference on paper 
and giving it to the experimenter along with other studies completed during an experimental 
session or in public by announcing their choice to the other participants in the experimental 
session.  The public condition was very public because in most cases there were at least 
seven other people in the experimental session.   However, it could have been the case that 
even though the private condition was perceived to be more private than the public condition, 
it was not perceived to be completely private.  Thus, perhaps all participants saw their 
responses to be public to some degree and indicated that they preferred the highly desirable 
option.  
 
STUDY 6: AMUSEMENT PARK STUDY WITH A “HOW” CONCRETENESS 
MANIPULATION  
 
The series of prior studies all provide evidence that people perceive that desirability 
considerations are more important, and feasibility considerations are less important, to others 
 45 
 
than to the self.  Given this robust finding, the objective of this study was to show that the 
level of representation (concrete vs. abstract thinking) is the mechanism underlying this self-
other effect. The CLT argues that the self is represented more concretely, while others are 
represented more abstractly.   The self is more familiar, and naturally people think of 
themselves in very concrete ways.   However, others are distant and less familiar, and thus 
people think of others in more abstract terms.   The account argues that these representation 
differences are the reason why people are more likely to prefer the highly feasible 
alternatives for themselves, but indicate that others have a preference for the highly desirable 
alternatives.   
Therefore, this study was designed to test whether the self-other effect will be 
attenuated as the representation of the other becomes more concrete (Hypothesis 4).  
Specifically, individuals will be more likely to choose the highly feasible, less desirable 
option for others when the other is represented concretely rather than abstractly.  Because 
people naturally think about themselves concretely, the concreteness manipulation is not 
predicted to have as pronounced an effect on self preference (i.e., the self will prefer the 
feasibility alternative in both the control and concreteness manipulation conditions).   
 The following two studies (Studies 6 and 7) use the same Amusement Park stimuli 
used in Studies 4 and 5.  Study 6 used a concrete representation manipulation from prior 
literature, which in this work will be referred to as the “how” manipulation (Freitas, 
Gollwitzer, and Trope 2004). This manipulation asked participants to complete an exercise 
that focused on how they could implement an activity (i.e., the process, not the outcome).  In 
the “how” manipulation condition, it is predicted that the self-other difference will be 
attenuated. Specifically, the “how” manipulation will prompt participants to think about 
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feasibility considerations and by doing so will realize that feasibility considerations can be 
important to others.  Consequently, participants in the “how” manipulation condition will 
report that others have a weaker preference for the highly desirable amusement park than 
those in the control condition.  The “how” manipulation is not predicted to result in any 
significant changes to self preferences because the self is naturally predisposed to value 
feasibility considerations.  In the control condition, it is predicted that individuals will report 
a greater preference for an amusement park that requires less driving time (i.e., the more 
feasible option) for themselves than they think others will have.  This result will replicate the  
self-other effect obtained in the earlier studies. 
 
Method 
 
Participants and design.   This study was a 2 (Condition: How vs. Control) x 2 (Target: Self 
vs. Other) between-subjects design.  Data were collected from undergraduate students (N = 
80; 56 females and 24 males) at a large southeastern university who were offered candy in 
exchange for their participation.   
Procedure.  Participants randomly assigned to the “how” manipulation condition began the 
study by completing a thought exercise, which asked them to consider how they do the things 
they do or in other words the process of how they do something.  Created by Freitas and 
colleagues (2004) and modified to fit the context of this study (i.e., the amusement park 
scenario) this concrete mindset manipulation consisted of a two-part thought exercise.  First, 
participants were asked to read a passage4 that focused their attention on how they would 
                                                 
4 For everything we do, there always is a process of how we do it. Moreover, we often can 
follow our broad life-goals down to our very specific behaviors. For example, like most 
people, you probably hope to find happiness in life. How can you do this? Perhaps finding a 
good job, or being educated, can help. How can you do these things? Perhaps by earning a 
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spend a day at an amusement park.  Participants were then asked to identify three ways they 
could spend the day at an amusement park.  After identifying the three ways, participants 
were then asked the following question “How much will engaging in this activity help you 
spend a day at an amusement park?” and were asked to answer this question in response to 
the three ways they listed on a 5-point Likert Scale anchored by 1 = a little and 5 = very, very 
much.   Then, in the second part of the “how” manipulation, participants listed four specific 
process activities that would help them spend the day at an amusement park.   The directions 
were: “To show how the goal of “Spending a day at an amusement park” can be met through 
specific activities, please fill in the 4 blank boxes below, in the series on the right. Beginning 
in the highest blank box (the one just below the box labeled “Spending a day at an 
amusement park”), fill in each box by answering the question “How I can meet the goal 
described in the immediately higher box?”  Participants were given an example with 
completed boxes for the goal of attaining life happiness that served as a guide for their task.  
Participants in the control condition began the actual study without completing this exercise. 
All participants were then asked to “suppose that a group of your friends has decided 
to take a trip to an amusement park next weekend” and were then presented with two 
amusement park options. Amusement Park A has several new rides, but is four hours away 
(high desirability/low feasibility) and Amusement Park B has no new rides, but is two hours 
away (low desirability/high feasibility).  Participants were asked to indicate which 
                                                                                                                                                       
college degree. How do you earn a college degree? By satisfying course requirements? How 
do you satisfy course requirements? In some cases, such as today, you participate in a 
marketing experiment. Research suggests that engaging in thought exercise like that above, 
in which one thinks about how one’s ultimate life goals can be expressed through specific 
actions, can improve people’s life satisfaction.  In this experiment, we are testing such a 
technique. This thought exercise is intended to focus your attention on how you do the things 
you do.  For this thought exercise, please consider the following activity:  
“Spending a day at an amusement park” 
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amusement park they would prefer to go to and also which park their friends would prefer on 
a 7- point Likert scale anchored by 1 = Strongly Prefer Amusement Park A; 7 = Strongly 
Prefer Amusement Park B.   For those in the self condition, participants were asked several 
specific questions to determine how important the desirability and feasibility considerations 
were to them.  These questions were: 1. How important is the newness of the rides to you and 
2. How important is the driving distance to you?  For the participants in the “how” 
manipulation condition, participants were asked similar questions to determine how 
important they thought the desirability and feasibility considerations would be for others.  
These questions were: 1. How important do you think the newness of the rides is to your 
friends and 2. How important do you think the driving distance is to your friends?  
Participants provided their responses to these questions on a 7-point Likert scale anchored by 
1 = Not At All Important; 7 = Extremely Important.  Two manipulation checks for the stimuli 
were also included.  The first asked participants which amusement park they would more 
enjoy spending the day at (1 = Enjoy Amusement Park A More; 7 = Enjoy Amusement Park B 
More).  The second asked which amusement park is easier to get to (1 = Amusement Park A 
Is Easier To Get To; 7 = Amusement Park B Is Easier To Get To).   
A set of questions measuring representation of the self and another set measuring 
representation of the other were also included depending on the condition to which the 
participants was assigned.  Participants in the self condition answered the following set of 
questions measuring representation of the self: 1. How concretely did you imagine yourself 
going to the amusement park (1 = Not At All Concretely; 7 = Very Concretely)?, 2. In how 
much detail did you think about your own day at the amusement park (1 = No Detail At All; 7 
= A Lot of Detail)?, and 3. How well were you able to visualize the day you would spend 
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going to the amusement park (1 = Not Well At All; 7 = Very Well)?  Participants in the other 
condition answered the following set of questions measuring representation of the other: 1. 
How concretely did you imagine your friends going to the amusement park (1 = Not At All 
Concretely; 7 = Very Concretely)?, 2. In how much detail did you think about your friends’ 
day at the amusement park (1 = No Detail At All; 7 = A Lot of Detail)?, and 3. How well were 
you able to visualize the day your friends would spend going to the amusement park (1 = Not 
Well At All; 7 = Very Well)?   
Results 
 
Manipulation Checks.  Participants indicated that they would enjoy going to Amusement 
Park A (the more desirable alternative with the new rides) more (M = 2.94 vs. scale midpoint 
of 4.0; t(1, 79) = 5.88, p < .001).  Participants indicated that Amusement Park B (the more 
feasible alternative closer to home) was easier to get to (M = 6.00) vs. scale midpoint of 4.0; 
t(1, 79) = 11.36, p < .001). 
 To test whether the “how” manipulation changed representation levels, two scales 
were created. The scale for representation of the self was created by averaging the three items 
designed to measure how concretely one thought of himself/herself going to the amusement 
park. The alpha for the self representation scale was .93, and the alpha would drop if any of 
the three items were dropped.  The scale for representation of others was created by 
averaging the three items designed to measure how concretely one thought of her/his friends 
going to the amusement park.  The alpha for the other scale was .85, and the alpha would 
drop if any of the three items were dropped.  The self representation scale did not reveal any 
significant differences in how concretely participants thought about themselves going to the 
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amusement park between those in the control condition (M = 4.38) and manipulation 
condition (M = 4.83; F(1, 39) = 1.60, p = .21, ns).  
The other representation scale did reveal a significant difference in how concretely 
participants thought about others going to the amusement park between those in the control 
condition (M = 4.25) and manipulation condition (M = 3.25; F(1, 39) = 6.03, p = .02).  
Inconsistent with predictions, participants in the control condition reported thinking about 
others more concretely than those in the “how” manipulation condition.  In other words, the 
“how” manipulation reduced people’s reports of how concretely they thought about others 
rather than increased them as the manipulation was intended to do.  It may have been the case 
that participants’ attempted to think concretely about others, but realized that this was 
difficult to do.  Similar to the research conducted by Schwarz (1998) who found that listing 
10 thoughts was perceived to be more difficult than listing 3 thoughts, it may be the case that 
the more participants thought about others, the more difficult, and thus less successful, they 
felt afterward, even though they in fact might have thought about others more concretely in 
the “how” condition than in the control condition. Consistent with predictions, participants 
did report that they thought about themselves (M = 4.61) more concretely than about others 
(M = 3.75; F(1, 79) = 9.33, p < .01).    
Preferences for Self vs. Others.  Consistent with predictions and results from prior studies, a 
marginally significant effect of target (self vs. other) emerged (F(1, 79) = 3.59, p = .06), such 
that participants indicated a greater preference for the highly feasible Amusement Park B for 
self (M = 4.53) than for others (M = 3.93).  Self preference was for the highly feasible 
Amusement Park B (M = 4.53 compared to scale midpoint M = 4.0; t(1, 39 = 2.77, p < .01), 
but others were thought to be indifferent between the two amusement parks (M = 3.93 
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compared to scale midpoint M = 4.0; t(1, 39) = .30, p = .77, ns).  In the control condition, 
participants indicated a greater preference for the highly feasible Amusement Park B for 
themselves (M = 4.50) than for others (M = 3.60; F(1, 39) = 4.69, p < .05).  In the “how” 
manipulation condition, no significant differences emerged between self preferences (M = 
4.55) and others’ preferences (M = 4.25; F(1, 39) = .39, p = .53, ns).  There was no 
significant main effect of condition (control vs. “how”; F(1, 79) = 1.22, p = .27, ns) nor a 
significant interaction between target and condition (F(1, 79) = .90, p = .35, ns).  See Table 2 
for results.   
Inferred Choice from Preference Data for Self and Others.  Preference data between the two 
amusement parks were collected on 7-point Likert Scales anchored by preferences for each 
Amusement Park.  These data were cut so that responses of 1 – 3 were inferred to indicate 
choosing to go to the highly desirable Amusement Park A and responses of 5 – 7 were 
inferred to indicate choosing to go the highly feasible Amusement Park B.  Reponses of 4 
were considered to be indifference between the two amusement parks and were eliminated 
for this analysis.  The pattern of results is consistent with predictions.  For self, participants 
chose to go to the highly feasible Amusement Park B more than to the highly desirable 
Amusement Park A regardless of the condition (χ2 (1)  = .08, p = .54, ns).  See Figure 6 for 
results.  For others, a marginally significant effect emerged whereby participants indicated 
that they would choose the highly desirable Amusement Park A in the control condition, but 
would choose the highly feasible Amusement Park B in the “how” manipulation condition.  
(χ2 (1) = 3.45, p = .06).  See Figure 7 for results. 
Importance of Rides to Self vs. Others.  Consistent with predictions and results from prior 
studies, a marginally significant effect of target (self vs. other) emerged, such that 
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participants indicated that the desirability attribute, rides, are more important to others (M = 
5.00) than to themselves (M = 4.43; F(1, 79) = 3.01, p = .09). There was no significant main 
effect of condition (control vs. “how”; F(1, 79) = .69, p = .41, ns) nor a significant interaction 
between target and condition (F(1, 79) = .69, p = .41, ns).  
Importance of Driving Distance to Self vs. Others.  No significant main effects of condition 
(control vs. “how”; F(1, 79) = 1.33, p = .25, ns) or target (self vs. others; F(1, 79) = .59, p = 
.44, ns) emerged nor did a significant interaction between the two (F(1, 79) = .04, p = .85, 
ns).  
Mediation Analysis.  Given that a marginally significant effect of target (self vs. other) 
emerged and target also was found to significant predict representation, a mediation analysis 
was performed to determine whether the level of representation mediations the effect of the 
target on preference (Baron and Kenny 1986).  First, a marginally significant effect of the 
independent variable (target) was found on the dependent variable (preference; t(1, 79) = 
1.89, p = .06).  Second, the independent variable (target) was also found to significantly 
predict the mediator (representation; t(1, 79) = 3.05, p < .01).  Third, when both the 
independent variable (target) and the proposed mediator (representation) are in the model 
predicting preference, target remains significant (t(1, 79) = 1.99, p = .05, but the proposed 
mediator is not significant (t(1, 79) = .65, p = .52, ns).  Thus, there is no evidence that the 
level of representation mediates the effect of target on preference.   
 
Discussion 
 
  Although the self representation scale did not reveal any significant differences in 
how concretely participants thought about themselves going to the amusement park between 
those in the control condition and concreteness manipulation condition, the other 
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representation scale did reveal a significant difference.  Participants reported that they 
thought more concretely about others in the control condition than in the concreteness 
manipulation, which is completely counter to predictions.  It was predicted that the 
concreteness manipulation would increase concrete thoughts of others, not reduce them.  One 
possible explanation for why participants reported thinking less concretely about others after 
the manipulation is that thinking about others was difficult, and thus participants reported not 
being very successful at this task similar to the findings by Schwarz 1986). This 
manipulation has been used previously (Freitas 2004) to increase concrete thinking and there 
is a significant self-other effect, consistent with predictions, where participants report 
thinking about themselves more concretely than others.  Also consistent with predictions, 
participants indicated a marginally greater preference for the highly feasible Amusement 
Park B for self than for others. The pattern of results from the inferred choice data is also 
consistent with predictions. For self, participants chose to go to the highly feasible 
Amusement Park B more than to the highly desirable Amusement Park A regardless of the 
condition, but for others participants indicated that they would be more likely to choose the 
highly desirable Amusement Park A in the control condition, but are more likely to choose 
the highly feasible Amusement Park B in the “how” manipulation condition.  Also consistent 
with predictions, participants indicated that the amount of new rides (i.e., the desirability 
attribute) was more important to others than to themselves.  However, participants did not 
indicate that driving distance (i.e., the feasibility attribute) was more important to themselves 
than others as was predicted to be the case.   
These results indicate that the “how” manipulation had the intended effect.  For self, 
the “how” manipulation did not produce significant changes preferences because self 
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preferences are naturally for the more feasibility alternative.  However, for others, the “how” 
manipulation did shift others’ preferences away from the highly desirable alternative and 
towards the more feasible one.  Unfortunately, there is no evidence from the representation 
scales that these self-other differences are a result of a shift in representation created by the 
“how” manipulation.  It may be the case that representation levels did shift, but these changes 
are not captured by the scales.  Or another factor not yet identified is the reason why these 
effects occur. 
The results from Study 6 provide evidence to support the predictions; however, it 
must be mentioned that two additional studies using the “how” manipulation found mixed 
results.  The first study (Study 6 Follow-up Study A) included a “how” 5 concreteness 
manipulation and a “why” 6 abstractness manipulation in addition to the control condition.  
The context of these manipulations was in a different domain (i.e., learning a new language) 
from the stimuli (i.e., amusement parks).  It was predicted that the “how” manipulation 
would shift others’ preferences toward the highly feasible Amusement Park B, but have little 
to no effect on self preferences because people themselves would already prefer a highly 
feasible alternative for themselves.    It was predicted that the “why” manipulation would 
have little to no effect on others’ preferences because people would already think that others 
would prefer the highly desirable Amusement Park A, but would shift self preferences 
toward the highly desirable Amusement Park A.  No significant effects were found of either 
                                                 
5 The how manipulation asked them to perform an exercise, which involved identifying how 
(i.e., the process) one would learn a new language.  The task was designed to induce a 
concrete mindset, which was predicted to carry over to the amusement park study.   
 
6 The why manipulation asked them to perform the same exercise as the how manipulation, 
but asked participants to identify why they should learn a new language.  The task was 
designed to induce an abstract mindset, which was predicted to carry over to the amusement 
park study.  
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one of the two manipulations on self or other preferences.  It could be the case that no 
significant results were found because the concreteness and abstractness manipulations did 
not carry over from one domain (i.e., learning a new language) to the other (i.e., amusement 
parks). Therefore, another study was designed to test whether the results of Study 6 can be 
replicated.   
In the second study (Study 6 Follow-up Study B), the “how” condition was identical 
to Study 6 and a control condition was included. The closed ended manipulation checks 
revealed a marginally significant effect (p = .07) of the “how” condition on self 
representation with participants reporting that they thought about their own preferences more 
concretely in the control condition than in the “how” condition. This pattern of results is 
counter to the design of the study, and the closed ended manipulation checks did not reveal a 
significant shift in representation of others’ preferences. When participants indicated their 
preference between the two parks, it was predicted that the how manipulation would shift 
others’ preferences away from the highly desirable Amusement Park A toward the highly 
feasible Amusement Park B.  There is a significant main effect where preference for the 
highly feasible Amusement Park B is greater among those in the “how” manipulation 
condition than in the control condition.  Therefore, the “how” manipulation did have a 
significant effect, and did shift preferences in the predicted direction.  However, no 
significant self-other effect emerged – the “how” manipulation shifted both self and other 
preferences toward the more feasible Amusement Park B.  The two additional dependent 
variables – importance of rides to self and others and importance of driving distance to self 
and others – were included to provide supporting evidence, but unfortunately both give 
conflicting evidence.  Looking at the importance of rides, a significant interaction emerged 
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between rides (importance to self vs. other) and condition.  In the control condition, rides are 
equally important to self and others, but in the “how” manipulation condition rides are more 
important to others than to self.   It was predicted that the “how” manipulation would make 
rides less important for others, not more important).  Looking at the importance of driving 
distance, there were no significant differences between conditions although it was predicted 
that the “how” manipulation would make driving distance more important for others.  
Regardless of condition, participants reported that driving distance was significantly more 
important to others than to self, which is counter to predictions.    
Taken together, Study 6 and Study 6 Follow-up Study B do not yield the same result 
using the exact same manipulation.  Please see Table 3 for summary of all the studies 
examining the role of representation.  Supporting predictions that self preferences would 
naturally be for the highly feasible alternative, and the “how” manipulation would have no 
significant effect on self preferences, Study 6 provides evidence that the “how” manipulation 
shifts only others’ preferences (not self preferences) toward the highly feasible alternative. 
However, in Study 6 Follow-up Study B, the “how” manipulation significantly shifted self 
preferences (as well as others’ preferences) more toward the highly feasible alternative.  
Even though it was not predicted, it is not unreasonable to find that the “how” manipulation 
strengthened self preferences for the highly feasible alternative. However, it is less than ideal 
to find that the “how” manipulation had a significant effect in one study, but not the other.  
As a result, there is a lack of conclusive evidence of the effect of the “how” manipulation on 
self preferences when the same context (i.e., choosing to go to an amusement park) is used 
for both the “how” manipulation and choice task.  That said, both studies (Study 6 and Study 
6 Follow-up Study B) do support the fact that the “how” manipulation did have the predicted 
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effect of shifting others’ preferences toward the highly feasible alternative. The following 
study was designed to test the same predictions using the same representation scales, but with 
a different concreteness manipulation in order to determine whether a different concreteness 
manipulation will yield more significant results consistent with predictions. 
 
STUDY 7: AMUSEMENT PARK STUDY WITH A NEW CONCRETENESS 
MANIPULATION 
 
This study was designed with the same objectives as the prior study - to identify the 
level of representation (concrete versus abstract) as the mechanism underlying the robust 
self-other effect.   Given that people think of others in abstract ways, a concreteness 
manipulation of representation was used to generate more concrete thinking about others.  
When thinking about others concretely, it was predicted that people would realize that 
feasibility concerns are also important to others as they are to themselves.  As a result, they 
would be more likely to indicate that feasibility considerations are important to others in the 
concreteness manipulation condition, and this would result in an attenuation of the self-other 
effect.  This would also provide evidence that shifts in representation are the underlying 
mechanism for the self-other effect. 
A different concreteness manipulation of representation than the one used in Study 6 
was developed to determine whether thinking about others more concretely would result in 
an attenuation of the self-other effect. This concrete manipulation is a highly modified 
version of a representation manipulation developed by Malkoc (2006).  Whereas the Malkoc 
(2006) manipulation was designed to induce an abstract representation, the manipulation 
used in this study was developed to induce a concrete representation. It is predicted that the 
concreteness manipulation would shift others’ preferences away from the desirability 
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consideration and toward the feasibility consideration.  For self, the concreteness 
manipulation is not predicted to have a significant effect because by default the self is 
represented concretely.   
Method 
 
Participants and design.   This study was a 2 (Condition: Concreteness Manipulation vs. 
Control) x 2 (Target: Self vs. Other) between-subjects design.  Data were collected from 
undergraduate students (N = 60; 44 females and 16 males) at a large southeastern university 
who were offered candy in exchange for their participation.   
Procedure.  All participants were asked to “suppose that you and a friend have decided to 
take a trip to an amusement park next weekend” and were then presented with two 
amusement park options. Amusement Park A has several new rides, but is four hours away 
(high desirability/low feasibility) and Amusement Park B has no new rides, but is two hours 
away (low desirability/high feasibility).   
Participants were randomly assigned to two manipulation conditions (concreteness vs. 
control). The concreteness manipulation used in this study was inspired by Malkoc (2006). 
The manipulation was reworded to fit the context of this study.  Additionally, in Malkoc 
(2006), the manipulation was used to generate an abstract level of representation whereas in 
this study it was modified to create a concrete level of representation. Specifically, in the 
concreteness manipulation condition, participants were asked do the following: “Please take 
some time to visualize your friend’s trip to the amusement park, and think carefully about the 
events that would comprise his/her trip. Please describe below in as much detail as possible 
all the steps he/she would need to follow, including activities involved in getting to the 
amusement park, spending the day there and returning home.”  They then were given space 
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to write about the steps involved in going to the amusement park.  Participants in the control 
condition did not see instructions, but rather saw immediately the questions described below. 
Participants were now asked several questions about themselves or their friend; 
depending on the target condition (self vs. other) to which they were randomly assigned.  
Participants in the self target condition were asked to indicate which amusement park they 
would prefer to go to on a 7- point Likert scale anchored by 1 = Strongly Prefer Amusement 
Park A; 7 = Strongly Prefer Amusement Park B.   They were then asked several specific 
questions to determine how important the desirability and feasibility considerations were to 
them.  These questions were: 1. How important is the newness of the rides to you and 2. How 
important is the driving distance to you.  Participants provided their responses to these 
questions on a 7-point Likert scale anchored by 1 = Not At All Important; 7 = Extremely 
Important.   
Participants in the other target condition were asked to indicate which amusement 
park their friends would prefer on a 7- point Likert scale anchored by 1 = Strongly Prefer 
Amusement Park A; 7 = Strongly Prefer Amusement Park B.   Participants were asked several 
specific questions to determine how important the desirability and feasibility considerations 
were to others.  These questions were: 1. How important do you think the newness of the 
rides is to your friends and 2. How important do you think the driving distance is to your 
friends?  Participants provided their responses to these questions on a 7-point Likert scale 
anchored by 1 = Not At All Important; 7 = Extremely Important.   
Four manipulation checks for the stimuli were also included.  All participants were 
asked to respond to the following questions. The first asked participants which amusement 
park they would more enjoy spending the day at (1 = Enjoy Amusement Park A More; 7 = 
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Enjoy Amusement Park B More).  The second asked which amusement park do you consider 
to be the more desirable alternative? (1 = Definitely Park A; 7 = Definitely Amusement Park 
B).  The third asked which amusement park is easier to get to (1 = Amusement Park A Is 
Easier To Get To; 7 = Amusement Park B Is Easier To Get To).  The last manipulation check 
asked which amusement park do you consider to be the more feasible alternative? (1 = 
Definitely Park A; 7 = Definitely Amusement Park B).   
A set of questions measuring representation of the self and another set measuring 
representation of the other were also included depending on the condition to which the 
participants was assigned.  Participants for whom the target was self answered the following 
set of questions measuring representation of the self: 1. How concretely did you imagine 
yourself going to the amusement park (1 = Not At All Concretely; 7 = Very Concretely)?, 2. 
In how much detail did you think about your own day at the amusement park (1 = No Detail 
At All; 7 = A Lot of Detail)?, and 3. How well were you able to visualize the day you would 
spend going to the amusement park (1 = Not Well At All; 7 = Very Well)?  Participants for 
whom the target was others answered the following set of questions measuring representation 
of the other: 1. How concretely did you imagine your friends going to the amusement park (1 
= Not At All Concretely; 7 = Very Concretely)?, 2. In how much detail did you think about 
your friends’ day at the amusement park (1 = No Detail At All; 7 = A Lot of Detail)?, and 3. 
How well were you able to visualize the day your friends would spend going to the 
amusement park (1 = Not Well At All; 7 = Very Well)?   
Results 
 
Manipulation Checks.  Participants indicated that they would enjoy going to Amusement 
Park A (the more desirable alternative with the new rides) more (M = 2.43 vs. scale midpoint 
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of 4.0; t(1, 59) = 7.64, p < .001).  Participants indicated that they would consider Amusement 
Park A to marginally be the more desirable alternative (M = 3.53 vs. scale midpoint of 4.0; 
t(1, 59) = 1.96, p = .06).  Participants indicated that Amusement Park B (the more feasible 
alternative closer to home) was easier to get to (M = 6.33) vs. scale midpoint of 4.0; t(1, 59) 
= 6.47, p < .001). Participants indicated that they would consider Amusement Park B to be 
the more feasible alternative (M = 5.23 vs. scale midpoint of 4.0; t(1, 59) = 6.47, p < .001).   
 To test whether the concreteness manipulation changed representation levels, two 
scales were created. The scale for representation of the self was created by averaging the 
three items designed to measure how concretely one thought of himself/herself going to the 
amusement park. The alpha for the self representation scale was .90.  The alpha would 
increase to .94 if the item asking how well participants were able to visualize the day they 
would spend going to amusement park were dropped.  This increase was not perceived to be 
very large, and thus all three items were retained in the self representation scale.  The scale 
for representation of others was created by averaging the three items designed to measure 
how concretely one thought of her/his friends going to the amusement park.  The alpha for 
the other scale was .77.  The alpha would increase to .88 if the item asking how much detail 
did you think about your friends’ day at the amusement park were dropped.  This increase 
was perceived to be large; however, the results do not differ if this item is dropped or not. 
Therefore, in analyses that follow, the other representation scale retains all three items used 
in the study. 
The self representation scale did not reveal any significant differences in how 
concretely participants thought about themselves going to the amusement park between those 
in the control condition (M = 4.93) and manipulation condition (M = 4.93; F(1, 29) = 0, p = 
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1, ns). The other representation scale also did not reveal a significant difference in how 
concretely participants thought about others going to the amusement park between those in 
the control condition (M = 4.00) and manipulation condition (M = 3.58; F(1, 29) = .76, p = 
.39, ns).  However, consistent with predictions, participants did report that they thought about 
themselves (M = 4.93) more concretely than about others (M = 3.79; F(1, 59) = 11.20, p = 
.001).    
Preferences for Self vs. Others.  No significant effect of target (self vs. other) emerged (F(1, 
59) = .26, p = .62, ns).  However, a marginally significant effect of manipulation did emerge 
(F(1, 59) = 3.80, p = .06) where participants in the control condition had a greater preference 
(M = 4.17) for the highly feasible Amusement Park B than those in the concreteness 
manipulation condition (M = 3.27).  This result is counter to the prediction that the 
concreteness manipulation would increase preferences toward the highly feasible 
Amusement Park B.  Additionally, a significant interaction emerged between target and 
condition (F(1, 59) = .26, p = .04). The concreteness manipulation shifted self preferences 
toward the highly desirable Amusement Park A as compared to control condition, but did not 
have a significant effect on other preferences. See Table 4 for results.  This pattern of results 
is also counter to predictions. The concreteness manipulation was predicted not to have a 
significant effect on self preferences because the self is already represented concretely.  It 
was predicted that the concreteness manipulation would have a significant effect on others’ 
preferences, shifting others’ preferences toward the highly feasible Amusement Park B. 
Inferred Choice from Preference Data for Self and Others.  Preference data between the two 
amusement parks were collected on 7-point Likert Scales anchored by preferences for each 
Amusement Park.  These data were cut so that responses of 1 – 3 were inferred to indicate 
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choosing to go to the highly desirable Amusement Park A and responses of 5 – 7 were 
inferred to indicate choosing to go the highly feasible Amusement Park B.  Reponses of 4 
were considered to be indifferences between the two amusement parks were eliminated for 
this analysis. Not surprisingly, but counter to predictions, the pattern of results replicate the 
results using the preference data.   
For self, participants indicated that they would be more likely to choose the highly 
feasible Amusement Park B in the control condition, but be more likely to choose the highly 
desirable Amusement Park A in the concreteness manipulation condition.  (χ2 (1) = 7.81, p < 
.01). See Figure 8 for results.  For others, participants indicated that they would be as likely 
to go to Amusement Park A as Amusement Park B regardless of the condition (χ2 (1)  = .04, 
p = .57, ns).  See Figure 9 for results. 
Importance of Rides to Self vs. Others.  No significant effect of target (self vs. other) 
emerged (F(1, 59) = .06, p = .81, ns). However, a significant effect of condition did emerge 
where participants in the concreteness manipulation condition indicated that rides were more 
important (M = 4.80) than those in the control condition (M = 3.83; F(1, 59) = 5.61, p = .02).  
This result is counter to predictions. The interaction between target and condition was found 
not to be significant (F(1, 59) = .79, p = .38, ns) 
Importance of Driving Distance to Self vs. Others.  No significant effect of target (self vs. 
other) emerged (F(1, 59) = .14, p = .71, ns). However, a marginally significant effect of 
condition did emerge where participants in the concreteness manipulation condition indicated 
that driving distance was less important (M = 4.39) than those in the control condition (M = 
4.97; F(1, 59) = 2.80, p = .10).  This result is counter to predictions. The interaction between 
target and condition was found not to be significant (F(1, 59) = 1.69, p = .20, ns) 
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Discussion 
 
 No representation differences were found with the three-item representation scales 
that were created to measure representation of the self and representation of others.  It was 
predicted that the concreteness manipulation would result in a change of representation (i.e., 
more concrete thinking) for others.  However, a significant difference did emerge where 
people indicated thinking about themselves more concretely than others.  This result is 
consistent with the thought that the self is naturally represented more concretely whereas 
others are more abstract.  Yet, the question remains whether the concreteness manipulation 
did change representation levels, and that change was not captured by the scales or whether 
no change actually occurred.  Given that the answer to this question is unknown, the results 
of this study need to be interpreted with caution.  The concreteness manipulation has a 
significant effect, but it is unclear whether it is due to shifts in representation. 
 The preference choice data revealed that there was a marginally significant effect of 
manipulation, but the pattern of results was not consistent with predictions.  Participants in 
the control condition had a greater preference for the highly feasible amusement park than 
those in the concreteness manipulation conditions.  A significant interaction also emerged 
between the target (self vs. others) and condition (concreteness manipulation vs. control).  It 
was predicted that the concreteness manipulation condition would shift others preferences 
toward the highly feasible Amusement Park B, but have little to no effect on self preferences 
which would already be for the highly feasible Amusement Park B.  The results do not match 
predictions.  The concreteness manipulation shifted self preferences toward the highly 
desirable Amusement Park A as compared to the control condition and did not have a 
significant effect on others’ preferences.  Given that the representation scales did not reveal 
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changes in representation levels between the control and concreteness manipulation 
conditions, it can not be argued that the change in representation is the underlying 
mechanism for these effects.  However, the concreteness manipulation did result in a 
significant shift in preferences, but why this shift occurred is unknown.  
 The inferred choice data tell a similar story in that participants indicated that they 
would be more likely to choose the highly feasible Amusement Park B in the control 
condition, but be more likely to choose the highly desirable Amusement Park A in the 
concreteness manipulation condition for themselves.  In the control condition, the results 
replicate prior studies where people are more likely to choose the highly feasible alternative 
for themselves.  The concreteness manipulation was predicted to have little to no effect on 
self choice, yet there was a significant effect and it was in the opposing direction to 
predictions.  It is unclear as to why the concreteness manipulation would shift self choice to 
the highly desirable alternative.  For others, it was predicted that the concreteness 
manipulation would significantly shift choice away from the highly desirable option and 
towards the highly feasible option.  However, the concreteness manipulation did not have a 
significant effect on others’ choices. 
 The two attributes used to create the two alternatives were the number of new rides 
(no new rides vs. several new rides) and driving distance (two hours away vs. four hours 
away).   Participants reported that rides would be equally important to self and others, but 
those in the concreteness manipulation condition indicated that rides were more important 
than those in the control condition, which is counter to predictions.   Participants reported 
that driving distance was equally important to self and others, but those in the concreteness 
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manipulation condition indicated that driving distance was less important than those in the 
control condition, which is also counter to predictions.  
 In summary, the scales designed to capture changes in self and other representation 
did not reveal any significant differences between the concreteness and control condition. 
However, the concreteness manipulation did have a significant effect, but in an opposing 
direction to that of predictions.  Therefore, it is unclear whether representation is playing a 
role and the scales are not capturing the changes in representation or whether the 
manipulation is changing something other than representation which is then resulting in these 
unpredicted effects.   
The uncertainty in interpreting and generalizing the results from this study also are 
magnified by the fact that another study was run with a similar concreteness manipulation 
and the results from that study are inconsistent with the results of Study 7.  Specifically, 
Study 7 Follow-up Study A used the same amusement park stimuli and had two concreteness 
manipulation conditions: “visualize”7 and “imagine”8 as well as control condition.   The 
visualize condition is very similar to that of Study 7.  The only difference was that the 
concreteness manipulation used in Study 7 was revised to focus more on concrete steps of 
going to the amusement park.  The predictions in Study 7 Follow-up Study A were the same 
to those in Study 7.  Specifically, both manipulations (visualize and imagine) were predicted 
to shift others’ preferences away from the highly desirable Amusement Park A and toward 
                                                 
7 Visualize your friend going and spending the day at the amusement park.  Describe in as 
much detail as possible the events that would comprise his/her experiences.  Make sure to 
talk about the various steps he/she would need to follow during the day, including activities 
in getting to the amusement park, spending the day there and returning home. 
 
8 Imagine your friend going to the amusement park as vividly as you can. Try to imagine all 
the details of the situation. Describe in as much detail his/her experience. You can also 
include any other information you think is relevant. 
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the highly feasible Amusement Park B, and result in an attenuation of the self-other effect.   
As compared to the control condition, the “imagine” manipulation shifted others’ preferences 
towards the more desirable Amusement Park A.  As compared to the control condition, the 
“visualize” manipulation did not significantly shift self preferences.   
Why did the “imagine” manipulation shift others’ preferences toward the more 
desirable Amusement Park A while the “visualize” manipulation did not have a significant 
effect on self or other preferences?  To answer this question, the thoughts the participants 
listed as part of the manipulation exercise were coded as either desirable, feasible, both or 
neither.  Desirable thoughts included phrases such as “Her favorite is Top Gun, which is the 
new, fastest roller coaster at the park” and “She will also smell different fast foods.”  Feasible 
thoughts included “First, he prints directions off Mapquest.com” and “The lines are going to 
be ridiculous.”  Some thoughts included both feasibility and desirability elements such as 
“Leave tired, but satisfied” and “Eat delicious, but expensive food.”  The number of 
desirability and feasibility thoughts was counted for each person.  It was found that 
participants listed more desirability thoughts (M = 5.31) in the “imagine” condition than in 
the “visualize” condition (M = 3.33; F(1, 105) = 13.61, p < .001).  Additionally, participants 
listed more feasibility thoughts (M = 6.35) in the “visualize” condition than in the “imagine” 
condition (M = 3.79; F(1, 105) = 19.79,  p < .001).  Given the greater average number of 
desirability (vs. feasibility) thoughts, in the “imagine” condition, it is not surprising that the 
others’ preferences shifted toward the highly desirable amusement park.  The “visualize” 
manipulation did not significantly shift self or other preferences.  Given the fact that 
participants in the control condition did not complete the manipulation, it was not possible to 
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code their thoughts. However, it is believed that the average number of thoughts in the 
control condition would be similar to that of the “visualize” condition.   
In addition to offering insight into why participants’ preferences were different in the 
two conditions, Study 7 Follow-up Study A shows that elaboration cannot be considered to 
be the same as concrete thinking.  Both the “imagine” and “visualize” manipulations required 
participants to elaborate on spending at day at an amusement park.  If more elaboration 
shifted preferences, then the preferences would have shifted in the same direction in both 
conditions.  Given that this was not the case, it must be the case that elaboration is not a 
substitute for concrete thinking.   
In summary, the coding of the data in Study 7 Follow-up Study A does offer valuable 
insight as to why the “imagine” manipulation shifted preferences toward the highly desirable 
amusement park.  However, in Study 7, a very similar “visualize” manipulation shifted self 
preferences toward the highly desirable Amusement Park A, but did not have a significant 
impact on other preferences.  In Study 7 Follow-up Study A, the “visualize” manipulation 
shifted others’ preferences toward the highly desirable Amusement Park A, but did not have 
a significant impact on self preferences.  Therefore, there are some inconsistencies between 
the results from these two studies. Although the “visualize” manipulations in the two studies 
are not identical, in Study 7 there is a significant effect in the opposite direction for self and 
in Study 7 Follow-Up Study A there is a significant effect in the opposite direction for others. 
The inconsistencies in the results of not only Study 7 and Study 7 Follow-up Study A, but 
also Study 6 and Follow-up Studies A and B, do not allow for a conclusive argument to be 
made that the level of representation is the underlying mechanism of the self-other effect.  
  
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 - GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
The results of eight studies show that social distance shifts construal levels similarly 
to temporal distance in that individuals predict that others value desirability considerations 
more and value feasibility considerations less than they do themselves.  Consequently, 
individuals make different decisions for others than they to for themselves. Individuals are 
more likely to choose a highly desirable, but less feasible item for another person than for 
themselves.   Additionally, because individuals perceive others to care about desirability 
considerations they express different preferences in different social settings.  Specifically, 
individuals are more likely to indicate that their own preference is for a highly desirable 
option in public than they are in private.  As a result, this effect has real implications for not 
only the choices individuals make for others, but also the choices they make for themselves.  
Two final studies explored the level of representation as the underlying mechanism for the 
self-other effect.  It was predicted that the self-other effect would be attenuated when people 
think more concretely about others.  Limited evidence was found to show that the level of 
representation results in that attenuation of the self-other effect. 
Study 1A used several subscales to reveal that people indicated that they are more 
value conscious (i.e., a feasibility attribute) than others, but predicted that others are more 
brand conscious (i.e., a desirability attribute) than they are.  Study 1B used two subscales 
from Study 1A to reveal that closeness of the relationship to the other moderates the self-
other effect.  People indicated that they were more value conscious than their friends, and 
that their friends were more value conscious than random others.  Additionally, individuals 
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indicated that others were more brand conscious than they were themselves.   In Study 2, 
participants viewed a store brand as a more feasible option (i.e., less expensive) and a 
branded product as a more desirable option (i.e., branded product is of higher quality). 
Consequently, people were more likely to choose the store brand for themselves than they 
were for others.  In Study 3, participants were more likely to return a sweater that was not 
feasible because it had to be dry cleaned, but predicted that others would return a sweater if it 
was not desirable by having a name brand.  In Study 4, individuals reported a greater 
preference for a consumer experience (i.e., an amusement park) that requires less driving 
time (i.e., the more feasible option), but indicated that others would have a greater preference 
for the amusement park with several new rides (i.e., the more desirable option). Study 5 
showed that people report different preferences in public by being more likely to vote for the 
highly desirable option in public and the highly feasible option in private.   
Studies 6 and 7 tested whether changing the level of representation of the other (i.e., 
thinking about the other more concretely) results in an attenuation of the self-other effect.  
Conflicting evidence was found between the two studies. In Study 6, a “how” concreteness 
manipulation shifted others’ preferences (not self preferences) toward the highly feasible 
alternative, which is consistent with predictions. Study 6 Follow-up Study A partially 
replicated the results by showing that the “how” manipulation shifted others’ preferences 
toward the highly feasible alternative. However, in the follow-up study, self-preferences were 
also significantly strengthened for the highly feasible alternatives.  In Study 7, a different 
concreteness manipulation lead to a significant shift in the opposite direction to predictions 
for self preferences and no significant shift for others’ preferences. Specifically, participants 
who completed the concreteness manipulation indicated a greater preference for the highly 
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desirable option, not the highly feasible one, for themselves.  The concreteness manipulation 
did not shift others’ preferences toward the highly feasible alternative as was predicted. 
Taken together, the role of the concreteness manipulation across these studies is mixed 
especially considering that the manipulation checks did not reveal a significant shift in 
representation between the manipulation and control conditions.  
This research extends CLT from temporal distance to social distance, and establishes 
its applicability to decisions regarding consumer products and experiences. Specifically, it 
was found that individuals predict that desirability considerations are more important to 
others than themselves while feasibility considerations are more important to themselves than 
to others. This prediction error manifested itself in the prediction of others’ preferences as 
well as when one is choosing on behalf of another person.  The prediction error impacts 
subsequent actions, such as likelihood of returning an item to the store. The error is 
attenuated as the relationship to the other becomes closer.  The prediction error also impacts 
the choices a person makes for oneself.  Because people predict that others value desirability 
considerations, they are more likely to place importance on desirability considerations in 
public than in private, and thus make different choices given different social settings.  
Therefore, this research shows the impact of CLT on choices individuals make for others as 
well as for themselves.   The level of representation was predicted to be the underlying 
mechanism of this effect, but unfortunately no conclusive evidence was found to support this 
prediction.   
Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
The prediction of others’ preferences, as well as choosing for others, is an important 
avenue for future research.  No less important is future research that studies the impact of the 
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self-other effect on individuals’ own behaviors and choices.  The consumer contexts, in 
which the self-other effect is studied, are also equally important.  Contexts in which decisions 
have serious and important consequences for both self and others, such as health care and 
financial services, are very interesting areas for future research.  Thus, future work in this 
area has potential to expand our knowledge about choices we make for others as well as 
ourselves, and the contexts of the choices we make for both self and others plays a very 
important role.  These ideas and others can explored further to extend the CLT, and further 
examine the role social distance plays in driving individuals’ perceptions of the tradeoffs 
between desirability and feasibility tradeoffs for self and others. 
 
Public/Private Social Settings 
Future research can further examine the different consumption choices individuals 
make in private versus public settings.   Specifically, research can look whether individuals 
make different consumption decisions depending on how conspicuous their choices are to 
others in different channels (i.e., physical store, catalog, Internet, etc.).  Additionally, 
research can investigate whether individuals feel comfortable and are likely to voice 
feasibility considerations when in public group settings.  If it is found that individuals are less 
likely to raise feasibility considerations in such settings, then this behavior may possibly 
result in the “group think” phenomenon.  
More specifically related to this research, more work needs to be done to test the 
public/private effect with actual products and services.   If convincing evidence is found, it 
will show that the self-other effect is not only important in the choice people make for others, 
but also the choice they make for themselves (i.e., people make different choices depending 
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on the social setting).  In this research, evidence for the public/private effect was found using 
a hypothetical scenario, but not with choices among actual products and service with a real 
social setting (public vs. private).  There are at least three areas for improvement in future 
studies.  
The first area for improvement is the selection of stimuli in order to find two options, 
which vary primarily on one feasibility dimension and one desirability dimension.  The goal 
would be to first establish that people will indicate a self preference for the highly feasible 
option and that others would prefer the highly desirable option.  The second area for 
improvement is the public/private manipulation. Specifically, making the participants in the 
private condition feel that their responses are really private is important to examine the 
differences in social settings (private vs. public).  With the right set of stimuli and an 
effective public/private manipulation, it is predicted that the hypothetical results reported 
here will replicate in actual study.  A significant public/private effect will not only increase 
evidence for the effect, but also show the importance of this phenomenon in real life 
decision-making.  The third area for improvement would be to explore the role of 
accountability with respect to the self-other effect.  It has been found that being held 
accountable for one’s decision shifts people in the direction of what the audience’s opinion, 
when the participant thinks he/she knows the opinion of the audience (Tetlock, Skitka and 
Boettger 1989).  Therefore, an accountability manipulation may work in the same way as the 
public/private manipulation used in Study 5, such that those held accountable will indicate a 
preference for the highly desirable alternative because they think others prefer that option 
(although they privately prefer the highly feasible alternative).  However, if participants were 
convinced that others share their feasibility concerns, then they may be likely to indicate their 
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preference for highly feasible option even when held accountable. Exploring the role of 
accountability may show similar patterns of results to the public/private manipulation, and 
may be another way to moderate the self-other effect. 
 
The Level of Representation 
Future research is also needed to establish that the level of representation is the 
underlying mechanism of the self-other effect.  In this research, representation was 
manipulated in several ways (i.e., a “how” manipulation in Study 6 and visualization of steps 
in Study 7). New concreteness manipulations can be developed and tested, such as new 
variants of the visualize and imagine concreteness manipulations used in Study 7 and Study 7 
Follow-up Study A that stress concrete thinking and actions.  Moreover, future research may 
clarify why the visualization of steps manipulation in Study 7 generated a pattern of results 
opposite to predictions.  Because the visualization instructions did ask participants to focus 
on all aspects of the day including going to, spending the day at and returning home, it may 
be the case the participants chose what to visualize.   It may have be easier and more 
interesting to visualize the fun aspects of going to an amusement park such as riding the 
rides, playing the games, eating food, and spending time with friends as the coding of the 
responses in Study 7 Follow-up Study A showed..  Also, it may have been less interesting to 
visualize the long, boring car ride to and back from the amusement park. Moreover, even if 
participants did try to visualize the car ride, they may not have fully appreciated the time and 
hassle of the drive due to duration neglect (Fredrickson and Kahneman 1993). Therefore, 
participants may or may not have tried to visualize the feasibility considerations of making 
the trip to the amusement park, but regardless the desirability considerations may have 
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played a greater role in the visualization task.  If this was the case, then it comes as no 
surprise that the visualize manipulation lead to a pattern of results opposite to predictions. 
Instead of shifting others’ preferences toward the highly feasible alternative as predicted, the 
visualize manipulation in Study 7 significantly shifted self preferences toward the highly 
desirable alternative and did not have a significant effect on others’ preferences because their 
preference was already for the highly desirable amusement park.  Future research can explore 
in more detail why the visualize manipulation lead to results, which were counter to 
predictions.  
Additionally, the question remains as to why the visualize manipulation in Study 7 
significantly shifted preferences in the opposite direction of predictions, whereas a very 
similar visualize manipulation in Study 7 Follow-up Study A did not significantly shift self 
nor other preferences.   It could be the case the instructions in the visualize manipulation in 
Study 7 asked participants to “Please take some time to visualize…” whereas the visualize 
manipulation in Study 7 Follow-up Study A began with “Visualize…”  By taking more time, 
participants may have spent more time thinking about the fun they would have at the 
amusement park, and thus the manipulation shifted their preferences toward the highly 
desirable amusement park. The visualize manipulation in Study 7 Follow-up Study A may 
not have been strong or specific enough to focus participants on effective in asking 
participants to consider the feasibility considerations of the choice, and thus the manipulation 
did not have a significant effect.  Lastly, the imagine manipulation in Study 7 Follow-up 
Study B, which was not very different from either of the visualize manipulations used in 
Study 7 and Study 7 Follow-up Study A, significantly shifted others’ preferences toward the 
highly desirable alternative and did not have a significant effect on self preferences. Again, it 
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may have been the case the wording of the manipulation (Imagine) that lead the participants 
to focus more on the desirability rather than the feasibility considerations of their choice. 
Future research can explore the unique effects of these manipulations as well generate new 
manipulations of the level of representation which significantly shift preferences in the 
direction of predictions. 
Other more indirect methods of manipulating levels of representation can be also 
explored.  One such way would be to prime different processing levels (concrete vs. abstract) 
using supposedly unrelated word search puzzles to see whether concrete processing will 
attenuate the self-other effect (Semin and Fiedler 1998; Paivio 1971). Another indirect 
manipulation may be to manipulate individual’s mood.  Prior research has found that people 
in good moods process at a more abstract level than those who are in a bad mood (Bless, 
Bohner, Schwarz, and Strack 1990). Manipulating people’s mood through watching video 
clips of happy or sad moments to induce different processing levels could be an interesting 
way to explore whether a concrete processing level attenuates the self-other effect.  New 
manipulations, either direct or indirect, can be tried to determine whether the level of 
representation is the underlying mechanism of the self-other effect. 
Another possible avenue would be to measure level of representation instead of or in 
addition to manipulating it.  One way to measure the level of representation would be to use 
the Behavior Identification Form (BIF) developed by Vallacher and Wegner (1989) and used 
by Levy et al. (2002) which is 25-item dichotomous-response survey.  For each of the items, 
participants must choose between an abstract representation such as “influencing the 
election” and a concrete representation such as “marking a ballot” to describe the action (e.g., 
voting).    The scale measures individual differences in the level of representation of different 
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actions, and can be used in lieu of or in addition to the manipulation of the level of 
representation in future studies. 
The challenge for future research will be the identification of a manipulation check, 
which will show a significant change in representation between the manipulation and control 
conditions.  In this research, a scale was developed to measure the change in representation, 
but the scale did not show a significant change in representation between the manipulation 
and control condition.  Either a change occurred and this change was not reflected in the 
scale or no significant change occurred. Thus both the manipulation and the manipulation 
check are critical components in establishing that the level of representation is the underlying 
mechanism of the self-other effect.   
This research sought to establish that the level of representation is the underlying 
mechanism of the self-other effect though numerous direct manipulations of representation.  
It is unfortunate that the results from the studies are mixed and inconclusive.  It is my belief 
that the level of representation is the mechanism for the self-other effect.  In Study 6, the 
“how” manipulation significantly shifted others’ preferences toward the highly feasible 
option, but did not significantly shift self preferences which were naturally for the highly 
feasible option.  These results are consistent with predictions and show that a concrete 
manipulation significantly attenuated the self-other effect.  Therefore, the results from Study 
6 provide evidence that the level of representation is the mechanism for the self-other effect.  
In both Studies 6 and 7, it was found that the people indicated thinking more concretely 
about themselves than about others.  This result is consistent with the CLT, which argues that 
that the self is represented concretely and others are represented more abstractly.  Therefore, 
it should follow that shifting the level of representation should lead to the attenuation of the 
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self-other effect, as was shown in Study 6. These results support the CLT, and affirm my 
belief that the level of representation is the underlying mechanism for the self-other effect. 
Unfortunately, the two representation studies (i.e., Study 6 and 7) using two different 
concreteness manipulations (i.e., the “how” manipulation in Study 6 and the visualization of 
steps manipulation in Study 7) did not provide consistent evidence to that effect. Specifically, 
Study 7 used a different manipulation, which was intended to make representation more 
concrete, but unfortunately had the opposite effect. The representation scales were also not 
able to show that significant shifts in representation occurred.  In addition to the level of 
representation, I believe that similarity or closeness of the relationship of the self to the other 
plays a significant role in the self-other effect.  More specifically, I believe representation 
may not only have a main effect, but also a significant interactive effect with similarity which 
is discussed below. 
 
The Role of Similarity to the Other 
Further research can also explore in greater detail the role of similarity to the other to 
the self or in other words the closeness of the relationship between the self and the other.  In 
this research (Study 1B), closeness of the relationship was manipulated.  It was predicted that 
closeness of the relationship of the other would moderate the effect.  Specifically, it was 
predicted that people would indicate that distant others would value brands more than their 
friends, and the results were directionally consistent, but not significant.  It was also 
predicted and found that that individuals themselves would place a lot of importance on 
value, and think that value is less important to their friends and even less important to 
random others.   Future research should look to provide further evidence that closeness of the 
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relationship is a significant moderator of the self-other effect.  Future studies can measure 
closeness of the relationship in addition to or instead of manipulating it. One previously 
developed measure of perceived similarity by Phillips and Ziller (1997) consists of 20 items.  
This scale measures individual differences in perceived similarity between self and others as 
well as across members of different social categories.   It can be used in future research to 
further test the moderating role of similarity on the self-other effect.  
Additionally, future research can study perceived similarity of the other in more 
“real” contexts.  One way to do so would be to use actual dyads, and ask participants to make 
choices for their actual partner and measure the closeness of the relationship of the two 
people comprising the dyad.  By doing so, there will be a greater understanding of the role of 
similarity/closeness of the relationship because real relationships may provide nuances that 
manipulated relationships do not.  For example, another may be perceived to be similar at a 
global level in terms of being a student in the same class.  However, the same other may be 
perceived to be different at a personal level with a different personality or interests.  These 
types of nuances can be explored using real relationships in future research. Additionally, 
having people make real choices for real people also provides for the opportunity to ask 
people about their satisfaction with the choices made for them.  It is believed that people will 
be less satisfied when they received the highly desirable, less feasible option than when they 
receive the highly feasible, less desirable option.  Lastly, asking people to make real choices 
for real people will show that the effect has important real-life implications.  
The Interactive Effect of the Level of Representation and Similarity  
Future research can also explore a possible interaction between representation and 
similarity (i.e., how similar they perceive the other person to be to themselves).  There has 
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been limited research in this area; however, one known research paper has explored the 
interactive effect between the level of representation and similarity (Levy, Freitas and 
Salovey 2002).  A significant interaction between the two was found such that abstract 
representations lead people to perceive more similarity between themselves and others than 
concrete representations. Not only were others perceived to be more similar, but also people 
were more likely to empathize with others, express willingness to help others, and donate 
money to help others in need when representation were abstract rather than concrete.  This 
research can be extended by looking at this interaction between the level of representation 
and similarity in the context of feasibility and desirability tradeoffs.  Specifically, it may be 
the case that similarity of the other will only have an impact when the level of representation 
of the other is abstract.  When representation of the other is concrete, individuals will already 
be more likely to choose the highly feasible, but less desirable product for the other 
regardless of whether the other is similar or not.  However, when representations of the other 
are abstract, individuals will be more likely to choose the highly feasible, but less desirable 
product for the other when the other is similar than when the other is dissimilar.  Future 
research can test this prediction, and further examine the interaction between similarity of the 
other and level of representation. 
 
Managerial Implications 
From a managerial perspective, this research shows one important way individuals 
mispredict others’ preferences, make poor choices for others, and mispredict how others will 
decide to return an item to the store.  First, this paper finds that people mispredict the 
preferences of others by consistently indicating that others value desirability considerations 
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more than they do and value feasibility considerations less than they do.  Second, individuals 
are more likely to make poor choices for others due to a focus on the desirability 
considerations of the product.  Third, individuals mispredict the items another person is 
likely to return.  Specifically, people indicate that they think others are more likely to return 
an item that in not very desirable when in reality individuals are more likely to return low 
feasibility items.   
As a result of this research, managers can make a number of changes in the buying 
process. First, sales staff can be trained to ask consumers if they are buying for themselves or 
someone else.  If buying for others, the sales staff can advise the customer to think of his or 
her own preferences to guide the selection process. Also, the sales staff can bring the issue of 
feasibility to the attention of the customer.  This will result in better purchases for others, as 
well as less item returns.  If the customer is buying for himself, then the shopping 
environment can be changed to create more private areas so that people are not influenced by 
others and thus more likely to be more guided by feasibility considerations.  Semi-private 
rooms can be created where the product can actually be used.  Through product trial, 
consumers could use the product, which would make feasibility considerations more salient 
in the retail environment. 
 
Concluding Words 
In summary, this research extends CLT by showing that social distance operates in a 
similar way to temporal distance in that individuals predict that others value desirability 
considerations more and value feasibility considerations less than they do themselves.   Thus, 
individuals are more likely to choose a highly desirable, but less feasible alternative for 
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others than for themselves.  In addition to making different choices for others than for 
themselves, this research shows that individuals also make different choices for themselves 
in different social settings.  Specifically, individuals are more likely to choose the highly 
desirable option in public because they perceive that others care extensively about 
desirability considerations and want to make a favorable self-impression by choosing the 
option they think others prefer.  Representation was explored at the underlying mechanism of 
this robust self-other effect; however, no conclusive evidence was found that the level of 
representation results in the attenuation of the self-other effect.  Thus, representation, as well 
as its possible interaction with the similarity to the other, is a very important area for future 
research. 
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Table 1 
 
Preference Means for the Different Sample Populations (Study 2) 
 
 Undergraduates MBAs Combined 
Self 4.80 3.51 4.23 
Other 4.49 2.91 3.80 
Note: Lower numbers indicate a preference for the National brand and higher numbers 
indicate a preference for the Store brand. 
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Table 2 
 
Preference Means Between Conditions (Study 6) 
 
 Control Condition “How” Concreteness 
Manipulation Condition 
Self 4.50a 4.55a 
Other 3.60b 4.25a 
Note: Lower numbers indicate a preference for the more desirable Amusement Park A and 
higher numbers indicate a preference for the more feasible Amusement Park B.  Subscripts 
show which means differ from one another (i.e., the same subscript indicates that the means 
do not differ and different subscripts indicate that the means do significantly differ) in each 
column. 
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Table 3 
 
Summary of the Representation Studies and Follow-up Studies  
 
Study  Manipulation Results 
Study 6 Freitas et al. 2004 “How” Concreteness 
Manipulation in the context of 
“Spending a Day at an Amusement 
Park” (the same context as the 
amusement park stimuli) 
Marginally Significant Effect in 
the Predicted Direction 
Manipulation marginally 
significantly shifted others’ 
preferences toward the highly 
feasible Amusement Park B, and 
there was no significant effect on 
self preferences (participants 
preferred highly feasible 
Amusement Park B for themselves 
regardless of condition). 
Study 6 
Follow-up 
Study A 
Freitas et al. 2004 “How” Concreteness 
Manipulation and “Why” Abstractness 
in the context of “Learning a New 
Language” (a different context than the 
amusement park stimuli) 
No Significant Effect 
Neither manipulation had a 
significant effect on self or other 
preferences 
Study 6 
Follow-up 
Study B 
Freitas et al. 2004 Manipulation of 
concreteness was identical to Study 6 
Significant Effect in the Predicted 
Direction 
Manipulation significantly shifted 
both self and other preferences to 
the highly feasible Amusement 
Park B 
Study 7 Visualize Manipulation inspired by 
Malkoc (2006): Please take some time 
to visualize your friend’s trip to the 
amusement park, and think carefully 
about the events that would comprise 
his/her trip. Please describe below in as 
much detail as possible all the steps 
he/she would need to follow, including 
activities involved in getting to the 
amusement park, spending the day there 
and returning home. 
Significant Effect in the Opposite 
Direction 
Manipulation significantly shifted 
self preferences towards the highly 
desirable Amusement Park A, and 
did not have a significant effect on 
others’ preferences. In the 
visualization, participants may 
have focused on the many fun 
activities of the Amusement Park, 
and not spent a lot of time 
imagining the long and 
monotonous car trip.  As a result, 
the self preferences shifted 
towards others’ preferences (for 
the highly desirable Amusement 
Park A).    
Study 7 
Follow-up 
Visualize and Imagine Manipulations 
inspired by Malkoc (2006): 
No Significant Effect with 
Visualize Manipulation and 
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Study A Visualize your friend going and 
spending the day at the amusement park.  
Describe in as much detail as possible 
the events that would comprise his/her 
experiences.  Make sure to talk about 
the various steps he/she would need to 
follow during the day, including 
activities in getting to the amusement 
park, spending the day there and 
returning home. 
 
Imagine your friend going to the 
amusement park as vividly as you can. 
Try to imagine all the details of the 
situation. Describe in as much detail 
his/her experience. You can also include 
any other information you think is 
relevant. 
Significant Effect with the Imagine 
Manipulation in the Opposite 
Direction 
Visualize manipulation did not 
have a significant effect on self or 
other preferences.  
Imagine manipulation significantly 
shifted others’ preferences toward 
the highly desirable Amusement 
A, and did not have a significant 
effect on self preferences.   
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Table 4 
 
Preference Means Between Conditions (Study 7) 
 
 Control Condition Concreteness Manipulation Condition 
Self 4.53a 2.67b 
Other 3.80a 3.87a 
Note: Lower numbers indicate a preference for the more desirable Amusement Park A and 
higher numbers indicate a preference for the more feasible Amusement Park B. Subscripts 
show which means differ from one another (i.e., the same subscript indicates that the means 
do not differ and different subscripts indicate that the means are marginally different, p = .08) 
in each column. 
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Figure 1 
 
Brand Consciousness and Value Consciousness Subscale Ratings for Self and Others (Study 
1A) 
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Figure 2 
 
Brand Consciousness Subscale Ratings for Self, Friend and Random Others (Study 1B) 
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Figure 3 
 
Value Consciousness Subscale Ratings for Self, Friend, Random Others (Study 1B) 
 
4.23
3.72
4.17
3.41
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
Self Others 
V
a
lu
e
 C
o
n
sc
io
u
sn
e
ss
Friend
Random Other
 
 
 91 
 
Figure 4 
 
Likelihood to Return Ratings for Self and Others (Study 3) 
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Figure 5 
 
Effects of Making Votes in Private vs. Public on Preference for Desirable vs. Feasible Option 
(Study 5) 
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Figure 6 
 
Effect of “How” Manipulation on Own Choice of Desirable vs. Feasible Option (Study 6) 
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Figure 7 
 
Effect of “How” Manipulation on Others’ Choice of Desirable vs. Feasible Option (Study 6) 
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Figure 8 
 
Effect of Visualize Manipulation of Own Choice of Desirable vs. Feasible Option (Study 7) 
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Figure 9 
 
Effect of Visualize Manipulation on Others’ Choice of Desirable vs. Feasible Option  
(Study 7) 
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